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ARTICLES
NO ARTICLE III STANDING FOR PRIVATE
PLAINTIFFS CHALLENGING STATE
GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATIONS: THE




In Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, the US. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that private plaintiffs did not have
standing to sue in federal court to challenge certain state greenhouse gas
(GHG) regulations because the plaintiffs failed to allege that the emissions
were significant enough to make a "meaningful contribution" to global GHG
levels. By contrast, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the US. Supreme Court held
that a state government had standing to sue the federal government for its
failure to regulate national GHG emissions because states are "entitled to
special solicitude in our standing analysis." Massachusetts implied, but did
not decide, that private parties might have less standing rights than states do
when it declared that "[uit is of considerable relevance that the party seeking
review here is a sovereign State and not .. . a private individual." Four years
later, in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut ("AEP"), the
Supreme Court, by an equally divided four-to-four vote, affirmed a decision
finding standing for both state and private plaintiffs in a tort suit seeking
GHG reductions. The Court stated that "[flour members of the Court would
hold that at least some plaintiffs have Article III standing under
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Box 210040, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio 45221-0040; Telephone 513-
556-0094; Fax 513-556-1236; e-mail brad.mank@uc.edu. I thank Michael Solimine for
his comments. All errors or omissions are my responsibility.
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Massachusetts." Commentators have speculated that the four Justices who
found that the AEP plaintiffs had standing may have agreed only that the
state plaintiffs had standing.
Justice Kennedy is usually the crucial swing vote in standing cases on the
current Court. Based on his questions during the Massachusetts oral
arguments, Justice Kennedy may have encouraged the majority to focus on the
"special" standing ights of states in that case. He also may be one of the four
Justices who supported standing rights for "some" plaintiffs in AEP.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Washington Environmental Council is
important because it is the most straightforward federal court of appeals
decision involving only private plaintiffs seeking to regulate GHGs. The
decision potentially bars all private GHG suits involving a limited number of
GHG emitters or quantity of GHG emissions, but the court did not decide the
broader question of whether private parties can challenge the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency's national regulation of the largest GHG
sources, including power plants and motor vehicles. The decision's broad
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INTRODUCTION'
In Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon,2 a three-judge panel
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that
1. This Article is one of a series of explorations of modern standing doctrine. The
other pieces are: Bradford C. Mank, Clapper v. Amnesty International: Two or Three
Competing Philosophies of Standing Law?, 81 TENN. L. REV. (forthcoming Winter 2013);
Bradford C. Mank, Informational Standing After Summers, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1
(2012); Bradford C. Mank, Is Prudential Standing jurisdictional?, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014); Bradford C. Mank, judge Posner's "Practical" Theory of Standing: Closer
to justice Breyer's Approach to Standing than to justice Scalia's, 50 Hous. L. REv. 71 (2012)
[hereinafter Mank,Judge Posner's "Practical" Theory ofStanding]; Bradford C. Mank, Reading
the Standing Tea Leaves in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 46 U. RicH. L. REv.
543 (2012) [hereinafter Mank, Tea Leaves]; Bradford Mank, Revisiting the Lyons Den:
Summers v. Earth Island Institute's Misuse ofLyons' "Realistic Threat" ofHarm Standing Test,
42 ARIz. ST. L.J. 837 (2010); Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights than
Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA's New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1701 (2008) [hereinafter Mank, States Standing]; Bradford C. Mank, Standing and
Future Generations: Does Massachusetts v. EPA Open Standing for Generations To Come?, 34
COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Mank, Standing and Future Generations];
Bradford Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons: A Risk-Based Approach to Standing, 36
EcOLOGY L.Q. 665 (2009); Bradford C. Mank, Standingfor Private Parties in Global Warming
Cases: Traceable Standing Causation Does Not Require Proximate Causation, 2012 MicH. ST. L.
REv. 869 [hereinafter Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases]; Bradford
Mank, Standing in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms: Using Economic Injury as a Basis
for Standing When Environmental Harm Is Difficult To Prove, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 307 (2010);
Bradford C. Mank, Summers v. Earth Island Institute: Its Implications for Future Standing
Decisions, 40 ENvrL. L. REP. 10,958 (2010); Bradford Mank, Summers v. Earth Island
Institute Rejects Probabilistic Standing but a "Realistic Threat" of Harm Is a Better Standing Test,
40 ENVIL. L. 89 (2010).
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two private non-profit groups did not have standing under Article III
of the U.S. Constitution to challenge certain Washington State
greenhouse gas (GHG) regulations because the plaintiffs failed to
allege that the emissions were significant enough to make a
"meaningful contribution to global GHG levels."' By contrast, in
Massachusetts v. EPA,' the U.S. Supreme Court held that a state
government had Article III standing to sue the federal government
for its failure to regulate national GHG emissions from motor
vehicles that arguably cause global climate change, despite the highly
diffuse and generalized nature of the harms involved, because states
are "entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis."5  The
Massachusetts Court did not explicitly decide whether private parties
have standing rights to bring climate change suits against the federal
government or large private GHG emitters. Nevertheless, the Court
suggested that private parties may have lesser standing rights when it
distinguished Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlif and announced that " [i]t is
of considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a
sovereign State and not, as it was in Lujan, a private individual."'
In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticute ("AEP'), the Supreme
Court, by an equally divided vote of four-to-four, affirmed the
decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit holding
that state and private plaintiffs had standing in a tort suit seeking
GHG reductions from the five largest utility emitters of certain GHGs
in the United States.' The Court stated, "Four members of the Court
would hold that at least some plaintiffs have Article III standing under
Massachusetts, which permitted a State to challenge [the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) ] refusal to regulate
[GHG] emissions; and, further, that no other threshold obstacle bars
2. 732 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2013), reh'en banc denied, 741 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2014).
3. Id. at 1135, 1145-46 (stating that the plaintiffs only demonstrated that the
GHG emissions from Washington State's five oil refineries made up 5.9% of
emissions in the state).
4. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
5. Id. at 518-21 (pointing out that Massachusetts owned a large portion of the
affected territory, reinforcing the conclusion that the injury to the state was
sufficiently concrete); see also Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Wanning
Cases, supra note 1, at 871, 881-82 (attributing the Court's decision to give states
greater standing rights in Massachusetts to the parens patriae doctrine).
6. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
7. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518; see also Mank, Standing for Private Parties in
Global Warming Cases, supra note 1, at 871, 881-82 (summarizing the Court's view that
states are "not normal litigants" for standing purposes because they have a "quasi-
sovereign interest in the health and welfare of their citizens").
8. 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
9. See id. at 2533-35 (rejecting the petitioners' argument that the federal courts
lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of the case).
1528 [Vol. 63:1525
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review."'o The Court did not explain whether "some" plaintiffs
included only state plaintiffs or also private plaintiffs, but
commentators have suggested that the four Justices may have decided
only that the state plaintiffs had standing." AEP remains an
enigmatic decision because both state and private plaintiffs were
involved, and the Supreme Court never explained whether private
plaintiffs alone might have standing.
Justice Kennedy is usually the crucial swing vote in standing cases
on the current Court." Based on his questions during the
Massachusetts oral argument, Justice Kennedy may have encouraged
the majority to focus on states' special standing rights." Further,
10. Id. at 2335 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Mank, Standing for
Private Parties in Global Warming Cases, supra note 1, at 873, 894 (highlighting that the
Court "took [an] unusual step" when it explained that it was equally divided on the
standing and jurisdictional issues).
11. See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, 'American Electric Power' Leaves Open Many
Questions for Climate Litigation, N.Y. L.J., July 14, 2011, available at http://www.arnold
porter.com/resources/documents/Arnold&PorterLLPNewYorkLawjournal-Gerrar
d 7.14.1 .pdf; see also Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases, supra
note 1, at 873, 897-98 (pointing out that the ambiguity in the opinion makes it
unclear whether the four Justices were also approving standing for private plaintiffs
in climate change cases).
12. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that "Congress has
the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a
case or controversy where none existed before," provided that Congress "identif[ies]
the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate[s] the injury to the class of persons entitled
to bring suit"); see also Mank, Informational Standing After Summers, supra note 1, at
25, 46-50, 52-54 (analyzing Justice Kennedy's swing vote in standing cases and
predicting that his vote will be crucial in future standing cases as well); infra Part IV
(same). See generally Jeremy P. Jacobs, Supreme Court: Wiretap Ruling Could Haunt
Environmental Lawsuits, GREENWIRE (May 20, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/stories
/1059981453 (speculating that justice Alito's footnote in Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l,
133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013), was inserted primarily to sway Justice Kennedy to join the
conservative group ofJustices); Charles Lane, Kennedy Seen as the NextJustice in Court's
Middle, WASH. PosT (Jan. 31, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/01/30/AR2006013001356.html (predicting that, after
Justice Alito joined the Supreme Court, "the O'Connor Court" might turn into "the
Kennedy Court" because Justices Alito, Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas would form a
conservative bloc, leaving Justice Kennedy, "a conservative who ... occasionally
vote[s] with liberals[,] . . . as the [C]ourt's least predictable member").
In five-to-four decisions during the most recent 2012-2013 Supreme Court term,
Justice Kennedy, the Court's "swing vote," agreed with the conservative Justices-
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito-52-73% of the time,
while he agreed with liberal Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan 30-
43% of the time. Drew DeSilver, Chart of the Week: Supreme CourtJustices-Who Agrees
with Whom, PEw RES. CENTER (June 28, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2013/06/28/chart-of-the-week-supreme-court-justices-who-agrees-with-whom
(presenting a chart that depicts the percentages of agreements in full, in part, or
only in the judgment in the Justices' twenty-three five-to-four decisions during the
2012-2013 Supreme Court term).
13. See infra Part IV.B (noting that even though none of the petitioners, amicus
briefs, or any of the three D.C. Circuit judges cited the parens patriae justification in
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Justice Kennedy may be one of the four Justices who supported
standing rights for "some" plaintiffs in AEP, and "some" plaintiffs may
refer only to state plaintiffs." The Supreme Court in a future
decision should squarely address the standing rights of private parties
in GHG litigation to provide clear guidance for courts and litigants.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Washington Environmental Council is
important for courts and parties involved in GHG suits because it is
the most straightforward federal court of appeals decision involving
only private plaintiffs seeking to regulate GHGs." Two prior district
court decisions involved private plaintiffs and a federally recognized
tribe." The plaintiffs filed tort suits against various energy companies
that sell fossil fuels that release GHGs." The federal district courts
applied a strict standing causation standard to dismiss these cases.'8
However, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
affirmed these decisions on other grounds and thus avoided the
controversial question of whether private parties have Article III
standing to file GHG suits.'
the lead-up to Massachusetts, during oral arguments in Massachusetts, Justice Kennedy
implied that it helped the plaintiffs' case).
14. See Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases, supra note 1, at
873, 897-98 (surmising that because Justice Kennedy brought up the parens patriae
doctrine during oral arguments in Massachusetts, he may only favor standing for states
in climate change cases); Mank, Tea Leaves, supra note 1, at 591-92 (stating that,
analyzing AEP and Massachusetts together, Justice Kennedy likely believes that only
states should have standing in GHG cases).
15. See infra Part V (summarizing the district court and Ninth Circuit decisions in
Washington Environmental Council, which involved private plaintiffs who sued three
state government agencies for not enforcing a state plan that purportedly required
the agencies to establish standards for GHG emissions).
16. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 852 (S.D. Miss. 2012)
(two private plaintiffs), affd on other grounds, 718 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2013); Native Vill.
of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (Village
of Kivalina, whose inhabitants are a self-governing, federally recognized tribe of
Inupiat Eskimos), affd on other grounds, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133
S. Ct. 2390 (2013).
17. Comer, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (group of oil companies); Kivalina, 663 F.
Supp. 2d at 868 (twenty-four oil, energy, and utility companies).
18. Comer, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 860-61 (finding that the plaintiffs could not prove
standing causation because they had not "allege[d] that the defendants' particular
emissions led to their property damage" and asserting that the court did not have a
"legal basis for adopting a ... lenient causation standard in global warming lawsuits"
(emphasis added)); Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 878-81 (holding that the plaintiff,
the village, could not prove standing causation in a public nuisance action because it
could not trace its harms to specific actions taken by the defendants that resulted in
GHG emissions and also rejecting the plaintiffs other theories of causation). But see
infra Part II.B (describing ChiefJustice Roberts's dissenting opinion in Massachusetts,
in which he argued that all global warming suits are generalized grievances best
resolved by the political branches rather than judges, and also asserting that the
Court should not apply a more lenient standing test for states).
19. See Comer, 718 F.3d at469 (affirming on res judicata grounds and not
addressing standing); Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 855-58 (holding that the Clean Air Act
1530 [Vol. 63:1525
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Whether private GHG suits meet Article III standing requirements is
a difficult question for lower courts because Massachusetts and AEP did
not resolve that issue. Furthermore, the concept of private plaintiffs
suing about a global problem raises the issue of whether, as Chief
Justice Roberts's dissenting opinion in Massachusetts argued,
generalized grievances affecting the public at large are better resolved
by the political branches rather than by the federal judiciary."
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Washington
Environmental Council that private plaintiffs are not entitled to the
special standing rights of state governments and that plaintiffs must
allege that their proposed remedy will make a "meaningful
contribution to global GHG levels"" could be precedent-setting. The
decision also could make future GHG suits by private parties more
difficult, but arguably not impossible, as it may not bar private suits
involving the EPA's national regulation of the largest GHG emitters."
Unfortunately, Part V will show that the broad language in the Ninth
Circuit's decision is arguably mere dicta that went beyond the facts of
the case in rejecting the possibility of private GHG suits." Part I
displaced the plaintiff's federal common law public nuisance claims but not deciding
Article III standing issues); see also Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming
Cases, supra note 1, at 872-73, 901-17 (providing a detailed overview of how "[l]ower
courts have divided regarding whether private parties have standing in climate
change cases," including the Comer and Kivalina courts). Previously, in Comer, a
threejudge panel concluded that private plaintiffs had Article III standing in a GHG
suit, but the Fifth Circuit vacated that decision when it granted en banc review.
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 860 (5th Cir. 2009), reh'g en banc granted,
598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed en banc, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010).
Bizarrely, the Fifth Circuit declined to hear the case after granting rehearing en banc
because too many judges had recused themselves. Comer, 607 F.3d at 1053-55.
Eventually the plaintiffs re-filed the case but only to have the district court dismiss
the case for lack of standing. See Comer, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 852-53, 860-62
(recounting the complicated prior proceedings in the case and dismissing the case);
see also Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases, supra note 1, at 904-
18 (clarifying Comer's complicated procedural history and summarizing the panel's
now-vacated opinion and rationale for finding standing).
20. See infra Parts II-III (discussing Massachusetts, including Chief Justice
Roberts's dissent, and AEP, including the district court's finding that the
political question doctrine barred jurisdiction and the Second Circuit's reversal
of that finding).
21. Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1145-47 (9th Cir. 2013), reh'g
en banc denied, 741 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2014).
22. See id. at 1145-46 (distinguishing Massachusetts, in which "the Court observed
that the GHG emission levels from motor vehicles were a 'meaningful contribution'
to global GHG concentrations, given that the U.S. motor-vehicle sector accounted
for 6% of world-wide carbon dioxide emissions," from the present case in which the
GHG emissions made up only 5.9% of emissions in Washington state, thereby
implying that plaintiffs may be more likely to satisfy the causation requirement if they
sue larger emitters of GHGs).
23. See infra Part V.D (highlighting that even the defendant-appellant in
Washington Environmental Council argued that the panel should rehear the case or at
1531
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discusses the basics of Article III standing and some possible
differences between the standing rights of private and public parties.
Part II examines the seminal state GHG suit standing decision in
Massachusetts and Chief Justice Roberts's dissenting opinion. Part III
explores the decisions of the district court, the Second Circuit, and
the Supreme Court in AEP, which involved both state and private
plaintiffs. Part IV analyzes Justice Kennedy's crucial swing vote in
standing cases, his emphasis on the role of statutory language in
defining standing rights, and his propensity to favor special standing
rights for states. Part V elucidates the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Washington Environmental Council and explores how it might affect
future private GHG suits.
I. INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRUDENTIAL STANDING
A. Constitutional Article III Standing
Although the Constitution does not explicitly require a plaintiff to
possess "standing" to file suit in federal courts, the Supreme Court
has inferred from Article III's limitation of judicial decisions to
"Cases" and "Controversies" that federal courts must utilize standing
requirements to guarantee that the plaintiff has a genuine interest
and a stake in the outcome of a case.24  "The federal courts have
least revise its opinion to temper the broad dicta that suggested private parties might
never be able to satisfy standing causation requirements in GHG cases).
24. The constitutional standing requirements are derived from Article III,
Section 2, which provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-
to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens
of another State; between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of
the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between
a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (footnote omitted); see Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310
(1944) (stating that Article III grants courts the power to "adjudicate cases and
controversies as to claims of infringement of individual rights whether by unlawful
action or private persons or by the exertion of unauthorized administrative power");
see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340-41 (2006) (explaining why
the Supreme Court infers that Article III's case and controversy requirement
necessitates standing limitations and clarifying that "[i]f a dispute is not a proper
case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it"); Mank, States Standing,
supra note 1, at 1709-10 (presenting the Supreme Court's three-prong constitutional
standing test and noting that "[a] federal court must dismiss a case without deciding
the merits if the plaintiff fails to meet" this test). But see Am. Bottom Conservancy v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 650 F.3d 652, 655-56 (7th Cir. 2011) (questioning
whether standing is based on Article III requirements and citing academic literature
by "reputable scholars" that critique the Article III standing argument). See generally
1532 [Vol. 63:1525
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jurisdiction over a case only if at least one plaintiff can prove that it
has standing for each form of relief sought." 5 For a federal court to
have jurisdiction over a claim, at least one plaintiff must be able to
prove standing for each form of relief sought; the court must dismiss
the case if no plaintiffs meet the standing requirements.26
Standing requirements are related to broader constitutional
principles. The standing doctrine prohibits unconstitutional advisory
opinions." Furthermore, standing requirements are consistent with
separation of powers principles delineating the division of powers
between the judiciary and political branches of government so that
"the Federal Judiciary respects the proper-and properly limited-
role of the courts in a democratic society." There is disagreement,
however, regarding to what extent separation of powers principles
limit Congress's authority to authorize standing to sue in federal
courts for private citizens challenging executive branch under- or
non-enforcement of congressional requirements that are mandated
by statute. 9
Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers, and Standing, 59 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 1023, 1036-38 (2009) (discussing a scholarly debate on whether the Framers
intended the Constitution to require standing to sue).
25. Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1710; see DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at
351-52 (confirming that "a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each
form of relief sought" (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000))).
26. See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 340-41 (emphasizing the importance of the
case or controversy requirement); Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180 (adding that
courts have an affirmative duty at the outset of the litigation to ensure that litigants
satisfy all Article III standing requirements).
27. See Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013) ("Article III of the
Constitution restricts the power of federal courts to 'Cases' and 'Controversies.'
Accordingly, [t]o invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, a litigant must have
suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely
to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Federal courts may not decide
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them or give
opinion[s] advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts."
(alterations in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
28. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 341 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750
(1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Mank, Standing and Future
Generations, supra note 1, at 26.
29. Compare Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-78 (1992)
(concluding that Articles II and III of the Constitution limit Congress's authority to
authorize citizen suits by any person lacking a concrete injury and citing several
recent Supreme Court decisions for support), with id. at 602 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the "principal effect" of the majority's approach to
standing was "to transfer power into the hands of the Executive at the expense-not
of the Courts-but of Congress, from which that power originates and emanates").
See generally Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 496 (2008)
(suggesting the "disagreement" is "[u]nsurprising[l" and arguing that courts should
not use standing doctrine "as a backdoor way to limit Congress's legislative power");
infra Part IV.A (discussing Justice Kennedy's views on the extent to which Congress
may define Article III standing injuries).
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The Supreme Court has established a three-part standing test that
requires a plaintiff to show that (1) she has "suffered an injury-in-
fact," which is (a) "concrete and particularized" and (b) "actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical"; (2) "there [is] a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,
meaning that the injury has to be fairly ... trace [able] to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th [e] result [of] the
independent action of some third party not before the court"; and
(3) "it [is] likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable decision."30 The burden is on the
plaintiff to prove all three elements of standing.3 While the strict
three-part standing test discussed in Lujan remains in effect, the
Court somewhat softened its effect in certain environmental cases by
subsequently holding in Fiends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.3 1 that plaintiffs who avoid
recreational or aesthetic activities because of "reasonable concerns"
about pollution have a requisite injury for Article III standing even if
they cannot prove actual harm to themselves or the environment.33
B. Private Versus Public Standing Rights
There are important historical distinctions between standing in
"public" and in "private" rights cases.3 ' For example, "[u]nder early
English and American practice, a private individual could bring suit
only to vindicate the violation of a private, as opposed to a public,
right."3  More specifically, under English common law, only the King
could prosecute the alleged violation of public rights, such as the
navigation of public waters or public highways.3 ' Further, beginning
30. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mank, Standing and
Global Warming, supra note 1, at 23-24 (stating that the Court also requires an injury-
in-fact for standing to bring suit under the Administrative Procedure Act).
31. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 342 (stating that parties asserting federal
jurisdiction must "carry the burden of establishing their standing under Article III");
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (same); see also LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 336 (3d ed.
2009) (adding that a plaintiff may initially allege general facts that, if true, would
establish the three standing elements, but, at the summary judgment stage, the
plaintiff must argue these facts more specifically and with additional support and
must ultimately prove the existence of injury, causation, and redressability).
32. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
33. See id. at 181-84; see also infra notes 369-72 and accompanying text.
34. See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL
L. REv. 275, 279-81 (2008) (describing "public rights" as those held by the
community and "private rights" as those held by individuals and granted or restricted
by legislative action).
35. Id. at 279.
36. Id. at 279-80.
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with the American Revolution and then throughout the nineteenth
century, American courts followed the English rule that the
violation of every private right carried a remedy and, therefore,
"awarded nominal damages for violations of private rights that did
not result in harm."37
During the twentieth century, the relationship between public and
private law in the United States became more complicated, but
important distinctions between the two categories remain.3 ' The
government is still more likely to take a leading role in enforcing
public rights." For example, the Supreme Court's decision in
Massachusetts demonstrates that states have special rights to protect
their natural resources, as discussed below.40 However, private
individuals may now sue to vindicate constitutional or statutory rights
in ways that pre-twentieth century courts would not have recognized."
The standing doctrine originally developed from the principle that
private parties could only enforce private rights and not public
rights.42 Modern standing doctrine recognizes that private parties
may enforce some types of public rights if a statute or constitutional
provision creates a private right of action, if a plaintiff has suffered a
personal injury, and if the suit does not violate separation of powers
principles.4 Because current standing doctrine does not clearly
distinguish between how litigants in private and public rights cases
must meet the three-part standing test discussed above, there are
many uncertainties about how standing principles apply in those
cases." Arguably, courts should apply a more lenient standing test in
common law private rights suits against private defendants than in
public rights suits against the government that raise separation of
powers concerns because standing causation involves one less step if a
37. Id. at 284-85.
38. Id. at 286-88 (explaining that, over time, the notion of public rights has
expanded beyond the traditional common law rights and that it now includes
statutory and constitutional rights as well).
39. Id. at 286.
40. See infra Part II.A.1 (noting that states can sue under the parens patriae
doctrine to protect their interests in health, welfare, and natural resources).
41. Hessick, supra note 34, at 286-89 (indicating that "the Court has recognized
[42 U.S.C.] § 1983 actions for violations of, inter alia, the Establishment Clause, the
Free Speech Clause, [and] the Due Process Clause" (footnotes omitted)).
42. Id. at 289.
43. Id. at 289-90.
44. See id. (stating that the Court's failure to distinguish between public and
private rights for standing purposes has created a "confused and confusing body of
[standing] law"); Gregory Bradford, Note, Simplifying State Standing: The Role of
Sovereign Interests in Future Climate Litigation, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1065, 1073 (2011)
("Despite its primary focus on the separation of powers as a justification for
restrictive standing, the Supreme Court has never clearly distinguished private rights
from public rights lawsuits for standing purposes.").
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plaintiff is suing a private defendant for harm allegedly caused by its
action than if the plaintiff is claiming the government has failed to
regulate a private party that is allegedly harming the plaintiff. 5
II. MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA: PARENS PATRIAE STATE STANDING
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court concluded that the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts had standing to sue the EPA for
failing to regulate GHGs from motor vehicles, which allegedly cause
climate change." Notably, the Court recognized that, pursuant to
the parens patriae doctrine, states sometimes have greater standing
rights than private litigants." However, because climate change
affects everyone in the world, Chief Justice Roberts argued in a
dissenting opinion that states do not have greater standing rights
than other litigants and also that the generalized injuries resulting
from climate change are better addressed through the political
process than by the judiciary."
A. Justice Stevens's Majority Opinion on State Standing
1. The special standing ights of states
The majority in Massachusetts used the parens patriae doctrine as a
justification for giving greater standing rights to states than to other
litigants." The parens patriae doctrine developed as an English
common law doctrine regarding the authority of the English King to
protect incompetent persons, including minors, the mentally ill, and
45. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 864-65 (5th Cir. 2009) (arguing
that the private suit in Comer involved a causal chain of one less step than the causal
chain accepted by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts because, in Comer, the
defendants' emissions were contributing to climate change, which, in turn harmed
the plaintiffs, whereas in Massachusetts, the EPA's failure to regulate led to increased
emissions, which contributed to climate change and thereby harmed the plaintiffs),
reh'g en banc granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed en banc, 607 F.3d 1049
(5th Cir. 2010); Hessick, supra note 34, at 299-300, 310, 316-17, 324-27 (arguing
that courts should not require proof of injury-in-fact in private rights cases); Mary
Kathryn Nagle, Tracing the Origins of Fairly Traceable: The Black Hole of Private Climate
Change Litigation, 85 TUL. L. REv. 477, 480-82 (2010) (criticizing strict standing
causation-and especially the "fairly traceable" requirement"-as constitutionally
unwarranted in private rights cases).
46. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525-26 (2007).
47. Id. at 518-20. See generally Mank, Standing and Future Generations, supra note 1,
at 68 (interpreting Justice Stevens's majority opinion as "suggest[ing] that states have
the authority to protect future generations" from climate change problems).
48. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535-37 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 518-20 (majority opinion).
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mentally limited persons .50 Since the early twentieth century, federal
courts have recognized that states may sue as parens patriae to protect
their quasi-sovereign interests in the health, welfare, and natural
resources of their citizens. 1
Relying on the parens patriae doctrine, Justice Stevens, writing for
the majority, stated that "the special position and interest of
Massachusetts" was important in determining standing.52  He
declared that "[i]t is of considerable relevance that the party seeking
review here is a sovereign State and not, as it was in Lujan, a private
individual."5  Justice Stevens cited the Court's 1907 decision in
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,54 where the Court held that Georgia
had standing to sue on behalf of its citizens to protect them from air
pollution crossing over the state's borders because of the state's quasi-
sovereign interests in its natural resources and the health of its
citizens." He also observed that the Court had long ago "recognized
that States are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking
federal jurisdiction."5  Justice Stevens concluded that "[j]ust as
Georgia's independent interest 'in all the earth and air within its
domain' supported federal jurisdiction a century ago, so too does
Massachusetts' well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory
today."5 ' Additionally, the majority stated that Massachusetts'
ownership of a substantial amount of coastline allegedly affected by
GHG emissions further justified the exercise of federal judicial power
because the state's ownership constituted a significant stake in the
outcome of the case.
Further explicating the parens patriae doctrine, Justice Stevens
explained that states had standing to protect their quasi-sovereign
interest in the health and welfare of their citizens because states have
50. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600
(1982); see Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1756-57 (stating the English King
had authority from his entitlement as the "father of the country").
51. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518-19 ("[A] State [may bring suit] for an injury
to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign. In that capacity[,] the State has an interest
independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its
domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their
forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air." (quoting Georgia v. Tenn. Copper
Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907))); see also Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1757-
59 (adding that the Court also initially recognized states' quasi-sovereign interests in
not being denied their rightful place in the federal system).
52. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518.
53. Id.
54. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
55. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518-19 (citing Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. at 237).
56. Id. at 518.
57. Id. at 519.
58. Id.
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surrendered three crucial sovereign powers to the federal
government: (1) states may not use military force; (2) states are
constitutionally prohibited from negotiating treaties with foreign
governments; and (3) state laws are sometimes preempted by federal
law. 59 Because states have yielded these three powers to the federal
government, the Court invoked the parens patriae doctrine to preserve
a special role for the states in a federal system of government by
recognizing that states can sue in federal court to protect their quasi-
sovereign interest in the health, welfare, and natural resources of
their citizens."o
Justice Stevens somewhat confusingly combined the parens patriae
doctrine with other arguments for granting standing in Massachusetts,
including a procedural right conferred in the Clean Air Act" (CAA)
to challenge the EPA's decision to reject the plaintiffs' rulemaking
petition." To support its conclusion that Massachusetts had the right
to sue, the Court relied on statutory language in the CAA to conclude
that Congress had required the EPA to use the federal government's
sovereign powers to protect states from vehicle emissions that "in [the
Administrator's] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare."" Additionally, Justice Stevens observed that Congress had
specifically created a procedural right to judicial review of the EPA's
denial of a rulemaking petition.' Combining these justifications, the
majority concluded that Massachusetts was entitled to "special
solicitude" under the Court's standing analysis."
A serious problem with the Massachusetts decision is that it did not
clarify to what extent the Court's recognition of special state standing
rights resulted from the parens patriae doctrine as opposed to either
statutory rights in the CAA or the special standing rights of plaintiffs
seeking to vindicate procedural rights." Because the Court's decision
in Massachusetts rested upon multiple considerations and not only the
special parens patriae standing rights of states, it is complicated to
59. Id.
60. Id. at 519-20.
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401- 76 71q (2012).
62. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519-20.
63. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (a)(1) (2006)).
64. Id. at 520 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1)).
65. Id.
66. See Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1733-34, 1746-47, 1755-56
(recognizing the resultant confusion over which factor was more important to the
Court's standing analysis-the existence of a procedural right or the involvement of
a state-and observing that this confusion has created ambiguity about, for example,
whether a private party owning a large piece of coastal property would have standing
based on the procedural right to judicial review under the facts of Massachusetts).
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evaluate whether the Ninth Circuit's approach to private party
standing rights in Washington Environmental Council is harmonious
with Massachusetts.17
2. Massachusetts meets the tests for injury, causation, and redressability
While believing that states are entitled to a more lenient standing
test under the parens patriae doctrine, the Massachusetts majority also
suggested that the Commonwealth had met the traditional three-part
Article III standing test for injury, causation, and redressability."
Regarding the injury prong, the Court determined that climate
change had caused rising sea levels that had already harmed
Massachusetts' coastline and could cause future harms as well.69
Rejecting the premise that prudential or constitutional principles bar
standing for any plaintiff seeking to challenge a generalized
grievance," Justice Stevens argued that the fact that the "climate-
change risks were 'widely shared' did not minimize Massachusetts'
interest in the outcome of [the] litigation."" Because Massachusetts
"own [ed] a substantial portion of the state's coastal property," the
Court concluded that the Commonwealth "ha[d] alleged a
particularized injury in its capacity as a landowner" even if many
others had suffered similar injuries.72
Addressing the causation prong of the standing test, the Court
pointed out that the EPA did not dispute the causal connection
between GHG emissions and global warming.73 In light of this
acknowledgement, the EPA's failure to regulate GHG emissions at
the very least "'contribute [d]' to Massachusetts' injuries.",7
Nevertheless, the EPA "maintain[ed] that its decision not to regulate
[GHG] emissions from new motor vehicles contribute [d] so
67. See infra Part V.B (explaining that the Ninth Circuit in Washington
Environmental Council did not apply the relaxed standing approach from Massachusetts
and instead found that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the causation and redressability
prongs of the standing test because their injuries were too attenuated from the
defendants' failure to set and apply GHG emissions standards).
68. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 526.
69. Id. at 521-23; see Mank, Standing and Future Generations, supra note 1, at 71-73
(explaining that the Court evaluated current and future harms to the
Commonwealth and suggesting that the "decision potentially allows states to serve as
representatives for future generations").
70. See supra Part II (discussing whether prudential standing or constitutional
standing principles restrict or prohibit suits alleging generalized grievances and
detailing the Justices' conflicting views as expressed in Massachusetts).
71. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522 (indicating that "[w]here a harm is concrete,
though widely shared, the Court has found injury-in-fact" (quoting Fed. Election
Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 523.
74. Id.
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insignificantly to [the] petitioners' injuries that the Agency [could
not] be haled into federal court to answer for them," primarily
because GHG emissions increases from countries like China and
India were "likely to offset any marginal domestic decrease" that
might result if the agency regulated GHGs from new vehicles.
The Court rejected EPA's causation argument because it "rest[ed]
on the erroneous assumption that a small incremental step, because
it is incremental, can never be attacked in a federal judicial forum.""
Additionally, the Court concluded that reducing domestic
automobile emissions would have a significant impact on global GHG
emissions because the U.S. transportation sector emitted more than
1.7 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide in 1999 and roughly similar
amounts in each succeeding year." Because domestic automobile
emissions account for more than 6% of worldwide carbon dioxide
emissions, the Court determined that "U.S. motor-vehicle emissions
make a meaningful contribution to greenhouse gas concentrations."78
As Part V discusses, the Ninth Circuit in Washington Environmental
Council emphasized the "meaningful contribution" language in
Massachusetts as a crucial test for distinguishing viable standing
causation in GHG challenges.79
Finally, in Massachusetts, the EPA similarly argued that the plaintiffs
could not satisfy the redressability prong of the standing test because
most GHG emissions come from other countries." Rejecting the
EPA's argument, the Court emphasized that the EPA had a duty to
reduce future harms to Massachusetts even if it could not prevent all
such harms, reasoning that "[w]hile it may be true that regulating
motor-vehicle emissions will not by itself reverse global warming, it by
no means follows that we lack jurisdiction to decide whether the EPA
has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it."" Responding to the
EPA's argument that its regulation of GHG emissions from new
75. Id. at 523-24.
76. Id. at 524.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 524-25.
79. See Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 2013)
(explaining that the Ninth Circuit in Washington Environmental Council decided not to
apply the relaxed standing approach from Massachusetts and instead found that the
plaintiffs failed to satisfy the causation and redressability standing prongs because
their injuries were too attenuated from the defendants' failure to regulate GHG
emissions), reh'g en banc denied, 741 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2014); infra Part V
(explaining why the Ninth Circuit did not find a sufficient nexus to establish a
"meaningful contribution" between the oil refineries' emissions levels and global
GHG levels in Washington Environmental Council).
80. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 525-26.
81. Id.at525.
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vehicles would have little impact because of increasing emissions
from other countries, the Court stated: "A reduction in domestic
emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increases, no
matter what happens elsewhere."82  Furthermore, the Court
suggested that the EPA had a duty to prevent catastrophic harms to
future generations." As Part V discusses, the Ninth Circuit in
Washington Environmental Council interpreted the Supreme Court's
approach to redressability in Massachusetts to require that a plaintiff's
proposed remedy significantly slow or reduce climate change and not
encompass any remedy that might only tangentially reduce GHGs by
a small amount.84
Despite its assertion that states enjoy "special solicitude" in
deciding standing questions, the Court's analysis of injury, traceable
causation, and redressability requirements in Massachusetts did not
provide clear reasons for distinguishing between the standing rights
of state and private plaintiffs. For example, a private landowner
could suffer similar injuries from rising sea levels as the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. While the Court did mention that
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts "owns a substantial portion of
the state's coastal property,"" there is no logical reason under
standing requirements why an injury to a large amount of land
should affect standing requirements differently from a similar injury
to a small amount of land, provided both injuries are concrete. The
traceable causation and redressability issues in climate change cases
arising from the fact that most emissions originate from outside the
United States are arguably similar whether the plaintiffs are states or
private parties."
82. Id. at 526.
83. Id. ("The risk of catastrophic harm, though remote, is nevertheless real. That
risk would be reduced to some extent if petitioners received the relief they seek. We
therefore hold that petitioners have standing to challenge [the] EPA's denial of their
rulemaking petition.").
84. See Wash. Envtl. Council, 732 F.3d at 1146-47 (concluding that the plaintiffs
did not prove that the action they sought would have reduced climate change to any
significant degree); infra Part V.B (analyzing the Ninth Circuit's reasoning).
85. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520.
86. Id. at 522 (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 342, 344 & n.21 (2d
Cir. 2009) (finding that both the states and private land trusts had standing to sue
five defendant electric power companies that used large amounts of fossil fuels
because both the states and private complaints asserted imminent future injuries to
their lands), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011); see also infra Part III (discussing the Second
Circuit's conclusion in AEP that both the private and state plaintiffs had standing).
88. See Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d at 345, 347-49 (noting that the states' and private
parties' complaints alleged the defendants, as GHG emitters, caused their injuries
and were redressable by the courts, but not explicitly comparing what the states and
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Because the Court did not clearly articulate the differences
between states' and private parties' standing rights, it is difficult to
discern whether the Ninth Circuit's narrow approach to private party
standing rights in Washington Environmental Council is consistent with
Massachusetts." Besides the difference between private and state
parties in these two cases, the outcomes of Washington Environmental
Council and Massachusetts may have differed because the quantity of
GHGs at issue in the former case was far less than in the latter case.90
That difference could be used to deny standing rights in any case
where a plaintiff does not allege that the defendant's emissions have
a significant impact on total global GHG emissions."
B. ChiefJustice Roberts's Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the
global problem of climate change was a nonjusticiable general
grievance that should be decided by the political branches rather
than by the courts." Additionally, he reasoned that it was
inappropriate for the Court to apply a more generous standing test
for states because there was no precedent, statutory basis, or logic for
such a differentiation." Furthermore, he contended that states do
not have greater standing rights under the parens patriae doctrine.
While suggesting that states and private parties have roughly
equivalent standing rights,95 Justice Roberts's dissenting opinion
essentially rejected the entire concept of GHG litigation by either
private parties or states. He asserted that growing emissions in
developing countries will eclipse any possible reductions ordered by
U.S. courts against domestic GHG emitters because U.S. sources are
only a minority source of global GHG emissions."
private parties specifically needed to show that they had standing); infra Part III.D
(detailing the Second Circuit's standing analysis).
89. See infra Part V.C (discussing observations regarding inconsistencies between
Washington Environmental Council and Massachusetts).
90. Compare Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 524 (involving 6% of global GHG
emissions), with Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1146 (9th Cir. 2013)
(involving 5.9% of GHG emissions in the state of Washington), reh'g en banc denied,
741 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2014).
91. See infra Parts V.C, Conclusion (speculating on the impact of the Ninth
Circuit's decision).
92. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 536-40.
94. Id. at 538-39.
95. Id. (comparing private associations with states and asserting that, to bring a
claim, both must justify that their members or citizens satisfy Article III standing
requirements).
96. See id. at 545 (noting that 80% of global GHGs originate outside of the
United States).
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1. The parens patriae doctrine does not provide Massachusetts with greater
standing rights
Chief Justice Roberts conceded that Tennessee Copper treated states
more favorably than private litigants, but he argued that the case did so
"solely with respect to available remedies."" He reasoned that "[tihe
case had nothing to do with Article III standing."" His point is
technically correct because the Court did not develop modem
standing doctrine until the 1940s, several decades after the Court
decided Tennessee Copper." However, Justice Roberts did not address
the majority opinion's implication that broad standing rights for
states would enhance states' abilities to enforce their quasi-
sovereign interests in protecting the health of their citizens and
natural resources. 00
Applying a narrow interpretation of the parens patriae doctrine,
Chief Justice Roberts argued that the doctrine could not decrease a
state plaintiffs obligation to prove an injury because "[a] claim of
parens patriae standing is distinct from an allegation of direct
injury.."101 "Far from being a substitute for Article III injury," he
continued, "parens patriae actions raise an additional hurdle for a state
litigant: the articulation of a 'quasi-sovereign interest' 'apart from the
interests of particular private parties.""o2 According to Chief Justice
Roberts, "a State asserting quasi-sovereign interests as parens patriae
must still show that its citizens satisfy Article III," and "[f]ocusing on
Massachusetts' interests as quasi-sovereign makes the required
showing here harder, not easier."'os
ChiefJustice Roberts argued that the Court did not explain how its
"special solicitude" for Massachusetts affected its standing analysis
"except as an implicit concession that petitioners cannot establish
standing on traditional terms."0 4 There is some merit to his criticism
of the majority opinion because Justice Stevens never clearly
explained to what extent the Court used Massachusetts' status as a
97. Id. at 537-38 (explaining that Tennessee Copper gave Georgia the right to
equitable relief while private litigants could olitain only a legal remedy).
98. Id. at 537.
99 See supra Part I.A (providing a brief overview of the history of Article III
standing and contemporary requirements).
100. See supra Part II.A.1 (highlighting states' role in acting on behalf of their
citizens in light of Massachusetts).
101. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 538 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
102. Id. (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S.
592, 607 (1982)).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 540.
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state to change its standing analysis.' 5 Chief Justice Roberts asserted
that "the status of Massachusetts as a State cannot compensate for
[the] petitioners' failure to demonstrate injury in fact, causation, and
redressability."'0 He argued that the petitioners failed to prove that a
causal connection existed between the alleged injury of loss of coastal
land in Massachusetts and the lack of new motor vehicle GHG
emission standards because "domestic motor vehicles [only]
contribute about 6[%] of global carbon dioxide emissions and 4[%]
of global [GHG] emissions."'0o He concluded that "[iun light of the
bit-part domestic new motor vehicle [GHG] emissions have played in
what petitioners describe as a 150-year global phenomenon, and the
myriad additional factors bearing on petitioners' alleged injury-the
loss of Massachusetts coastal land-the connection is far too
speculative to establish causation."'O' Chief Justice Roberts would
probably agree with the Ninth Circuit in Washington Environmental
Council that the far smaller 5.94 million metric tons of carbon dioxide
equivalents at issue, or 5.9% of Washington State GHG emissions,
were too insignificant to be a legally significant cause of the global
problem of climate change.'09
Furthermore, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the issue of
redressability was particularly troublesome for the plaintiffs because
of the "tenuous link between [the] petitioners' alleged injury and the
indeterminate fractional domestic emissions at issue [in the case]," as
well as the additional problem that the "petitioners [could not]
meaningfully predict what [would] come of the 80[%] of [GHG]
emissions that originate outside the United States.""o Chief Justice
Roberts rejected the majority's conclusion that "any decrease in
domestic emissions will slow the pace of global emissions increases,
no matter what happens elsewhere.""' He argued that the Court's
reasoning failed to satisfy the requirement that it be "likely" that a
remedy will redress the "particular injury in fact" at issue in the
105. See Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1733-34, 1746-47, 1755-56
(criticizing the Massachusetts majority for not clarifying whether and to what extent
the special treatment of state standing in the case resulted from the parens patriae
doctrine as opposed to the special standing rights of plaintiffs seeking to vindicate
procedural rights).
106. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 540 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 544.
108. Id. at 544-45.
109. See Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1143 (9th Cir. 2013)
(providing the quantity of emissions in question), rehg en banc denied, 741 F.3d 1075
(9th Cir. 2014); infra Part V.B (discussing how the relatively small amount of
emissions may have been a factor in the Ninth Circuit's decision).
110. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 545 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 546.
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case."' Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that "even if regulation does
reduce emissions-to some indeterminate degree, given events
elsewhere in the world-the Court never explains why that makes it
likely that the injury in fact-the loss of land-will be redressed."" 3
Again, Chief Justice Roberts would likely agree with the Ninth
Circuit's conclusion in Washington Environmental Council that the far
smaller 5.94 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (or
5.9% of Washington State GHG emissions) at issue were too
insignificant to redress global climate change when foreign emissions
are growing at a far greater rate than any possible reductions from
tightened regulations in one state."'
2. ChiefJustice Roberts argued that the plaintiffs' claim was a nonjusticiable
general grievance that is better suited for resolution by the political branches
Even granting the plaintiffs' assumption that climate change is a
significant public policy problem, Chief Justice Roberts argued that
complaints about climate change are nonjusticiable general
grievances that should be decided by the political branches rather
than by the federal courts."' Initially, he asserted that the
petitioners' injuries from global warming failed to meet Lujan's
requirement that the alleged injury be "particularized" because the
injuries were common to the general public."' Moreover, Chief
Justice Roberts contended that the Court's lax application of
standing principles in this case failed to consider separation of power
principles limiting the judiciary to "concrete cases.""' He also
argued that the majority's recognition of standing in a case involving
policy issues affecting the entire nation and the world led the Court
to intrude into policy decisions that are only appropriate for
resolution by the political branches of government."' Clearly, Chief
Justice Roberts would deny standing in climate change cases to both
private and state plaintiffs because he believes that the political
branches rather than the Article III courts should address generalized
harms from global issues.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Wash. Envtl. Council, 732 F.3d at 1143-44; see also infra Part V (providing the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning).
115 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535-36 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 540-41 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 &
n.1 (1992)).
117. Id. at 539-40, 547.
118. Id. at 535, 548-49.
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III. AMERUCANELECTRIC POWER CO. V. CONNECTICUT (AEP)
A. The Plaintiffs'Public Nuisance Action
The plaintiffs in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut filed suit
before the Supreme Court's seminal Massachusetts decision in 2007."'
In 2004, two groups of plaintiffs filed separate complaints in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging that the
five defendant electric power companies were committing a public
nuisance.120  According to the plaintiffs, the power companies
operated fossil fuel burning plants in the United States that emitted
large quantities of carbon dioxide and that significantly contributed
to global climate change.1'2 Eight states filed the first complaint ("the
state plaintiffs") ,'122 and three nonprofit land trusts23 filed the second
complaint ("the land trust plaintiffs").'12 The defendants were "four
private companies and the Tennessee Valley Authority, a federally
owned corporation that operates fossil-fuel fired power plants in
several [s]tates."'"2  The complaints asserted that the defendants
"[were] the five largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the United
States."'2  Annually, the five utilities collectively emitted 650 million
tons of carbon dioxide, which constituted "25[%] of emissions from
the domestic electric power sector, 10[%] of emissions from all
domestic human activities, and 2.5[%] of all anthropogenic emissions
worldwide."' By contrast, the plaintiffs in Washington Environmental
Council sought more stringent regulation of industries that emitted
only 5.94 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents, or 5.9%
of Washington State's total GHG emissions, and did not specifically
address how much those emissions comprised of national or global
GHGs emissions levels.128
119. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2533 (2011).
120. Id. at 2333-34.
121 Id.
122. California, Connecticut, Iowa, NewJersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont,
and Wisconsin filed the first complaint; however, NewJersey and Wisconsin withdrew
by the time the case went before the Supreme Court. Id. at 2533-34 & n.3.
123 Id. at 2534 n.4.
124. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y.
2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
125 Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2534 & n.5 (noting that the four private
defendants were the American Electric Power Co. and one of its wholly owned
subsidiaries, Southern Co., Xcel Energy Inc., and Cinergy Corporation).
126. Id. at 2534.
127 Id.
128. Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1143-44 (9th Cir. 2013), reh'
en banc denied, 741 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2014).
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In their complaints, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants'
carbon dioxide emissions worsened global climate change and
thereby violated either the federal common law of interstate
nuisance, or, in the alternative, state tort law.12' The state plaintiffs
alleged that their public lands, their infrastructure, and the health of
their citizens were at risk from climate change.so The land trust
plaintiffs alleged that climate change would destroy habitats for
animals and rare species of trees and plants on land they owned and
conserved.'"' Both plaintiffs "sought injunctive relief requiring each
defendant to cap its carbon dioxide emissions and then reduce them
by a specified percentage each year for at least a decade."'12
B. The District Court Invokes the Political Question Doctrine
In 2005, the Southern District of New York dismissed both suits as
presenting non-justiciable political questions.' Invoking separation
of powers concerns, the court held that the complex issue relating to
whether and how to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel
burning power plants was a political question for resolution by the
political branches and, therefore, not appropriate for judicial
resolution.'34 Relying on the six-factor test from Baker v. Car'15 for
determining what is a non-justiciable political question,' the district
court concluded that a public nuisance suit seeking to reduce carbon
dioxide emissions from numerous electric power plants presented a
non-justiciable political question because of "the impossibility of
deciding [the issue] without an initial policy determination of a kind
129. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2534.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y.
2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2527.
134. Id.
135. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
136. Id. at 217 (asserting that, unless one of the factors is inseparable from a
particular case, a court should not dismiss the case as a non-justiciable political
question). In Baker v. Carr, the Court set forth six independent tests for the existence
of a political question:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id.
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clearly for nonjudicial discretion." 137 The court determined that the
"identification and balancing of economic, environmental, foreign
policy, and national security interests" is a policy determination
properly suited for resolution by the political branches, and,
therefore dismissed the plaintiffs' complaints.13  The district court's
use of the political question doctrine to dismiss GHG suits is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's willingness to consider
GHG suits by states in Massachusetts. It is closer in approach to
Chief Justice Roberts's dissenting opinion in Massachusetts in
characterizing GHG suits as better addressed by the political
branches rather than by the judiciary. 3
C. The Second Circuit Reverses and Allows an "Ordinary Tort Suit" To
Proceed
The Second Circuit vacated the district court's decision.o4 0  The
case's procedural history was unusual because the case was argued in
2006 but not decided until 2009.141 The long delay was likely caused
in part by the Second Circuit postponing its decision until the
Supreme Court decided Massachusetts, which the Second Circuit
discussed extensively.'4 ' Additionally, Judge Sonia Sotomayor was a
member of the original three-judge panel of the Second Circuit
until she became a Supreme Court Justice in August 2009.'4 The
two remaining members of the Second Circuit panel decided the
case on September 21, 2009, pursuant to a Second Circuit rule that
allows two judges to decide a case if the third member of the panel
becomes unavailable.14 4
137. Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S.
267, 278 (2004) (plurality opinion)). The court explained that the plaintiffs' prayer
for relief, which would have required the plants to reduce their carbon dioxide
emissions over several years, was non-justiciable for several reasons. Id. The court
noted that making a decision on the plants' carbon dioxide emissions would require
the court to arbitrarily set a cap on the defendants' emissions and determine what
percentage reduction to impose. Id. The court would then have to set a schedule to
implement the reductions, consider the foreign policy implications of its plan, assess
the availability and practicality of alternative energy sources, and then balance the
implications with national security concerns-all without policy determinations from
Congress or the Executive. Id. at 272-73.
138. Id. at 274.
139. See supra Part II.B (asserting that the global problem of climate change is a
non-justiciable generalized grievance and rejecting the concept of GHG litigation by
states and private parties).
140. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009), rev'd,
131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
141. Id. at 310.
142. Id. at 336-38.
143. Id. at 314 n.*.
144. Id. at 310, 314 n.*.
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Addressing the threshold jurisdictional questions, the court of
appeals held that the suits were not barred by the political question
doctrine and that all of the plaintiffs' complaints met Article III
standing requirements.14 The Second Circuit rejected the district
court's and the defendants' views that the complex issues involved in
the case made it a non-judiciable political question.'4 ' The Second
Circuit observed that federal courts had adjudicated many
complicated common law public nuisance cases for more than one
hundred years."' Crucially, the Second Circuit characterized the
plaintiffs' suit as "an ordinary tort suit" suitable for judicial
resolution. 4s The court of appeals acknowledged that Congress, by
legislation, or the executive branch, by appropriate regulations,
might regulate power plant emissions of carbon dioxide and thereby
displace the judiciary's role under federal common law.1'
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the political question doctrine
did not bar the plaintiffs' suit because it was similar in its essential
nature to other public nuisance cases that courts had handled in the
past, even if climate change was a new issue."'
Assessing the merits of the case, the Second Circuit held that all of
the plaintiffs had stated a claim pursuant to the federal common law
of nuisance.'' The court of appeals relied on several Supreme Court
decisions that held that states may maintain suits to abate air and
water pollution produced by other states or by out-of-state industry.'
At the time, the EPA had not promulgated a rule to regulate GHGs.'5 1
Accordingly, the Second Circuit concluded that the CAA did not
displace the plaintiffs' federal common law cause of action because it
could not "speculate as to whether the hypothetical regulation of
145. Id. at 332, 349 (observing that "not every case with political overtones is non-
justiciable" because "[i]t is error to equate a political question with a political case"
(citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962))).
146. See id. at 329 (asserting that although the plaintiffs' injuries resulted from a
global problem with climate change, it did not mean the courts could not assess the
defendants' contributions to the problem).
147. Id. at 326.
148. Id. at 329, 331.
149. Id. at 332.
150. See id. at 329, 332 (reiterating that federal courts are adept at assessing
complex scientific evidence); see also infra Part III.D (discussing the Second Circuit's
application of standing doctrine).
151. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d at 371.
152. See id. at 350-51 (citing a case that involved acid gas from a Tennessee
foundry that destroyed orchards and crops in Georgia, as well as a case involving
sewage from Illinois that was poisoning Missouri's water supply).
153. See id. at 379 (recognizing that the "EPA ha[d] not even proposed to make any
findings" when the Second Circuit ruled in AEP).
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[GHGs] under the Clean Air Act would in fact 'speak[] directly' to
the 'particular issue' raised" by the plaintiffs.15 1
D. The Second Circuit's Standing Analysis
The district court explicitly refused to address the defendants'
standing arguments because it found that the standing issues were
"intertwined" with the merits and concluded that the regulation of
greenhouse gases was a political question beyond the scope of the
federal courts' jurisdiction.5 5 Because it reversed the district court's
dismissal of the case on political question grounds, the Second
Circuit found it necessary to address whether the plaintiffs had
standing to sue.15' The court examined whether the state plaintiffs
had parens patriae standing and concluded that any uncertainties in
Massachusetts about the relationship between that standing doctrine
and traditional Article III standing were irrelevant because the state
plaintiffs met both tests."' The Second Circuit also discussed
whether the state and land trusts plaintiffs had Article III standing in
their proprietary capacity as property owners.15 8  The court then
applied the three-part Article III standing test for (1) injury, (2)
causation and traceability, and (3) redressability. 5
The Second Circuit found that the state plaintiffs had adequately
alleged a current injury by demonstrating that increasing
temperatures caused by rising levels of carbon dioxide had reduced
the size of the California snowpack and thereby reduced the supply of
freshwater in that state.' Additionally, similar to the majority's
decision in Massachusetts, the court determined that the states also
reasonably alleged future injury to their coastal lands from rising sea
levels caused by climate change because there was sufficient scientific
evidence that rising sea levels would inevitably harm the states'
coastlines and that such a certain injury was imminent even if it might
154. Id. at 380-81 (second alteration in original) (citing Cnty. of Oneida v.
Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 236-37 (1985)).
155. Id. at 332 (quoting Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265,
271 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
156. Id. at 315, 333.
157. Id. at 334-39. The Second Circuit did not specifically address whether New
York City had standing because only one plaintiff needs to have standing for a suit to
proceed. Id. at 339 n.17 (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights,
Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006)).
158. See id. at 339-40 (recognizing that the standing test for trusts is the same as
that for individuals).
159. Id. at 340-49.
160. See id. at 341-42 (holding that property damage unique to California satisfied
both the concrete and particularized injury requirements).
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not occur for years.' 6 ' For the same reason, the land trust plaintiffs
had adequately proven future harm to their properties from rising
sea levels caused by increasing levels of carbon dioxide.112
Following the reasoning in Massachusetts, the Second Circuit
concluded that the defendants' significant contribution as the five
largest utility sources of GHGs in the United States was sufficient to
establish causation and traceable injury for Article III standing, even
though a majority of global GHG emissions come from other
sources.' The Second Circuit also cited decisions from two other
courts of appeals for the principles "that, particularly at the pleadings
stage, the 'fairly traceable' standard is not equivalent to a
requirement of tort causation" and, therefore, that the plaintiffs'
allegations of harm from the defendants' power plants were sufficient
to prove standing causation at that stage of the pleadings.' The
Ninth Circuit's decision in Washington Environmental Council is
arguably distinguishable on the issue of standing causation
because it involved the far smaller GHG emissions of five refineries
in one state rather than the five largest utility GHG emitters in the
United States."'
Regarding the redressability prong of the standing test, the
defendants argued that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that
their proposed remedy of reducing carbon dioxide emissions from
the defendants' power plants was likely to prevent global warming.'
The Second Circuit concluded that the defendants' redressability
arguments were foreclosed by the Massachusetts decision.'6 ' Following
the reasoning in Massachusetts, the plaintiffs demonstrated that a
court decision ordering reductions in the defendants' power plant
emissions would likely slow or reduce the pace of global climate
161. Id. at 342-44; cf Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521-23 (2007) (pointing
to the "strong consensus" by scientific experts that climate change would continue to
cause environmental and economic harm to Massachusetts).
162. See Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d at 342-44 (commenting that even though the
trusts did not provide a specific time frame for their injuries, the injuries were
certainly imminent).
163. Id. at 345, 347; cf Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523-25 (rejecting the argument
that any relief the petitioners sought would be offset by substantial increases in GHG
emissions from China, India, and other developing nations because even "a small
incremental step . .. can [be] attacked in a federal judicial forum).
164. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d at 346-47.
165. See infra Part V.B (explaining why the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs
failed to prove causation in Washington Environmental Council).
166. See Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d at 348 (rejecting the contention that the negative
effects of global warming can only be redressed by regulating emissions from third
parties not party to the litigation).
167. Id.
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change, even if it would not stop it entirely.' 8 Similar to the
overlapping issue of standing causation, the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Washington Environmental Council is arguably distinguishable from
the Second Circuit's decision in AEP on the issue of redressability
because the former case involved the far smaller GHG emissions of
five refineries in one state, while the latter case involved the five
largest utility GHG emitters in the United States."'9
The Second Circuit's conclusion that the state plaintiffs had
standing was understandable given the similarities in the injuries
alleged and the causation and redressability in Massachusetts and
AEP.'70 However, the Second Circuit's conclusion that the private
land trust plaintiffs had standing was more questionable because the
Massachusetts decision did not address private parties' standing rights
and because the Second Circuit did not need to resolve whether the
private parties had standing once it found that the state parties had
standing to raise the same claims and to seek the same remedies as
the private plaintiffs."' Moreover, the Massachusetts decision even
suggested that the states had greater standing rights than private
parties.' The Second Circuit arguably should have avoided the
controversial issue of standing for the private plaintiffs since the
states and private land trust plaintiffs sought the same injunctive
remedies.' The court possibly treated the standing rights of the
private and state plaintiffs as roughly equivalent, although the court
never explicitly compared the standing rights of states and private
parties.'74 By contrast, the Ninth Circuit's in Washington Environmental
168. Id. at 348-49.
169. See infra text accompanying notes 308-11 (explaining how the Ninth Circuit
distinguished the two cases).
170. See supra Part III.A (discussing the Second Circuit's conclusion in AEP that
both the private and state plaintiffs had standing).
171. See Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d at 348-49.
172. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518-20 (2007) (attributing the
special standing analysis for the Commonwealth to the protection of its quasi-
sovereign interests); supra Part II.A (discussing Massachusetts and the Court's
analysis of state standing).
173. SeeJonathan H. Adler, The Supreme Court Disposes of a Nuisance Suit: American
Electric Power v. Connecticut, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 295, 304-05, 312 n.79
(suggesting the Court's standing analysis should have stopped once it determined
that at least one state satisfied the constitutional requirements).
174. See Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d at 342, 344-45, 347-49 (finding the states' and
trusts' complaints both primarily concerned imminent future injuries, alleged the
defendants caused their injuries, and were redressable by the courts, but not
explicitly comparing what the states and private parties specifically needed to show to
demonstrate that they had standing).
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Council emphasized that private plaintiffs in GHG suits do not enjoy
the same standing rights as the state plaintiff did in Massachusetts.7 5
E. The Supreme Court's Standing Decision in AEP
1. Summary of the Court's standing affirmance
In almost all cases involving a tie vote, the Supreme Court simply
announces that "[t] he judgment is affirmed by an equally divided
Court.""' The Supreme Court usually follows that formulaic
response because an equally divided vote simply affirms the decision
below without setting precedent for other lower courts outside of that
circuit."' In the AEP decision, however, the Court took the unusual
step of providing some explanation of how it divided on the standing
and other jurisdictional questions, although it did not announce the
identities of the Justices who voted for or against standing." 8  The
Court stated:
The petitioners contend that the federal courts lack authority to
adjudicate this case. Four members of the Court would hold that at
least some plaintiffs have Article III standing under Massachusetts,
which permitted a State to challenge [the] EPA's refusal to
regulate [GHG] emissions; and, further, that no other threshold
obstacle bars review. Four members of the Court, adhering to a
dissenting opinion in Massachusetts, or regarding that decision as
distinguishable, would hold that none of the plaintiffs have Article
III standing. We therefore affirm, by an equally divided Court, the
Second Circuit's exercise of jurisdiction and proceed to the
merits. 79
175. See Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1145 (9th Cir. 2013)
(concluding that the plaintiffs, as "private organizations,... [could not] avail
themselves of the 'special solicitude' extended to Massachusetts by the Supreme
Court"), rehg en banc denied, 741 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2014).
176. See, e.g., Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312, 2313 (2011) (per
curiam); see also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 191-92 (1972) (noting that the
Court has affirmed decisions by equally divided votes since the early 1800s and
explaining that an affirmance by equally divided Supreme Court does not have
precedential weight).
177. Biggers, 409 at 191-92; see Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 110-13
(1868) (discussing doctrine in American and English law that no affirmative action
can be taken on a case where the judges are equally divided); Lyle Denniston,
Opinion Analysis: Warming an EPA Worry, at First, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2011, 1:31
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/06/opinion-analysis-warming-an-epa-worry-
at-first ("Because the Court split [four-to-four] on the right to sue issue, that part of
the Second Circuit decision was left intact, but without setting a nationwide
precedent."); see also Gerrard, supra note 11 (stating that the standing portion of the
AEP decision did not technically set precedent).
178. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011).
179. Id. (citations omitted).
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While technically not binding on the lower courts outside of the
Second Circuit,'8 o the Court's four-to-four affirmance of the standing
decision provides important clues about how the Court might rule in
future standing cases, at least until the Court's membership changes.
2. The four Justices on each side of standing in AEP
The voting in the Massachusetts decision offers the best guide to
how the eight Justices voted in AEP. In Massachusetts, five Justices
found that the Commonwealth had standing under the parens patriae
doctrine and general Article III standing principles: Justices Stevens,
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.' Three of these Justices-
Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer-were still members of the
Court when AEP was decided, and some commentators have
assumed that they voted in favor of standing in AEP, consistent
with their endorsement of broad state standing principles in the
Massachusetts decision.'82
Four Justices dissented in the Massachusetts decision-specifically,
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito-joined Chief Justice Roberts and
said that standing was inappropriate.18 ' These fourJustices remained
on the Court at the time of the AEP decision.8 Again, the most
logical presumption is that these four Justices voted against standing
in AEP, as they had in Massachusetts.8 -
By the time of the AEP decision, Justices Stevens and Souter had
retired from the Court and had been replaced by Justices Kagan and
Sotomayor, respectively.'18 Justice Kagan was the only member of the
Court who voted in AEP, but she was not a member of the Court
when Massachusetts was decided. Commentators have assumed that
she voted with Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer in AEP
180. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
181. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 501, 526 (2007) (naming the Justices
who found that the Commonwealth had standing because rising sea levels had
harmed Massachusetts and because a favorable ruling from the Court could reduce
the risk of future harm to the Commonwealth).
182. See, e.g., Gerrard, supra note 11 ("Though unnamed in the opinion, clearly
the four [J]ustices who find standing, and no other obstacles to review, are Justices
Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Anthony Kennedy.").
183 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (rejecting the
challenges as non-justiciable).
184. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, U.S. SUP. CT.,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (last visited May 14,
2014) (displaying the Court's membership in a timeline, stretching back to the
Court's inception).
185. See Gerrard, supra note 11 ("The four who disagree [that there is standing in
the AEP decision] are Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia,
Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito.").
186. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 184 (providing
the length ofJustices' terms and who they replaced on the Court).
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because it is unlikely that any of the Justices who dissented in
Massachusetts changed their minds about standing for the AEP
decision."' Furthermore, in her brief time on the Court, Justice
Kagan has generally endorsed a permissive view of standing for
plaintiffs' 8 and has most often voted with Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer.'" Similarly, based on her permissive view of standing'90
and propensity to vote with the other justices appointed by
Democratic Presidents,' it is likely, although not certain, that
187. Experienced judges do not easily change their views once they declare them
in a written dissenting opinion, as Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito did when they
joined Chief Justice Roberts's dissenting opinion in Massachusetts, which is discussed
supra, Part II.B. Furthermore, these same four Justices, in an opinion written by
Justice Alito, adopted a narrow "certainly impending" standing test in a case that
denied standing in a suit in which plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the National
Security Agency (NSA) was likely spying on their telephone and e-mail
communications because they represented clients who were suspected terrorists or
linked in some way to suspected terrorists because the plaintiffs could not prove with
absolute certainty that the Agency was spying on them, even though it seemed more
likely than not. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
188. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2681, 2685-89 (2013)
(noting that Justice Kagan joined Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, which drew
sharp distinctions between prudential standing and Article III standing in stating that
prudential standing rules are "more flexible" than the jurisdictional requirements of
Article III standing and concluded that the requirement of adversarial parties was a
flexible prudential requirement that could be satisfied by the participation of leaders
of the House of Representatives as amicus curiae, even though the plaintiffs and the
defendant U.S. Government agreed that a statute denying federal marital tax
exemptions and other privileges to same-sex couples was unconstitutional); Clapper,
133 S. Ct. at 1159-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (indicating that Justice Kagan joined
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion, which argued for broad probabilistic standing
and rejected the majority opinion's narrow "certainly impending" test in a case
denying standing against the NSA where it seemed likely that the government was
spying on the plaintiffs but they could not prove their claims with absolute certainty);
Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1450-52 (2011) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing, in an opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Sotomayor, that the majority opinion "devastate[d] taxpayer standing" and that the
plaintiff taxpayers had standing to challenge Arizona's tuition tax credit); see also
Adler, supra note 173, at 313 (finding it likely that Justice Sotomayor would have
found at least one plaintiff satisfied the Article III standing requirements had she
participated and voted in AEP).
189. During the Supreme Court's 2010-2011 term, Justice Kagan voted with
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer in 91% and 87% of all cases, respectively. Stat Pack for
October Term 2010, SCOTUSblog 19 (June 28, 2011), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com
/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/SB OT1O statLpackfinal.pdf [hereinafter StatPack].
190 See sources cited supra note 188.
191. See Robert Barnes, justices Who Will Shape Supreme Court's Future Are Matching
Pairs, WASH. POST (June 28, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/justices
-who-will-shape-supreme-courts-future-are-matching-pairs/2011/06/28/AGOaNopH
.story.html (suggesting that the voting consistency of new Justices might be related
to the highly scrutinized process of selecting nominees and noting that "[Justice]
Sotomayor has voted consistently with liberal Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen G. Breyer"); see also Stat Pack, supra note 189, at 19 (reporting that, between
liberal Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Justices Breyer and
Ginsburg and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor agreed the least number of times
during the 2010-2011 term-at 85% of the time).
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Justice Sotomayor would vote for state standing in cases similar to
Massachusetts and AEP.'92
3. The impact ofAEP on future standing cases
Implicitly, the Court's decision in AEP supported and even
broadened the Court's standing analysis in Massachusetts.1 3  Four
Justices concluded that at least "some" of the AEP plaintiffs met
Article III standing requirements in light of Massachusetts." The
plaintiffs mentioned in AEP were probably the state plaintiffs because
the Massachusetts decision only clearly endorsed standing rights for
states to bring suits involving climate change.' 9 Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Washington Environmental Council implied
that the plaintiffs referred to in AEP were likely only the state
plaintiffs, and, therefore, that private plaintiffs seeking to regulate
GHGs did not enjoy the same rights as state plaintiffs.'"
The four Justices who concluded that at least some of the plaintiffs
had Article III standing also observed that "no other threshold
obstacle bars review."' In a footnote, the Court explained: "In
addition to renewing the political question argument made below,
the petitioners now assert an additional threshold obstacle: They
seek dismissal because of a 'prudential' bar to the adjudication of
generalized grievances, purportedly distinct from Article III's bar."' 98
The four Justices who found that some of the AEP plaintiffs had
Article III standing also implicitly concluded that neither the political
question doctrine, the prudential standing doctrine, nor any "other
threshold obstacle" barred review of their claims."' As a result, these
four Justices implicitly "expanded standing rights beyond
Massachusetts' statutory setting to common law cases."200
What remains uncertain is whether a majority of the Court would
grant the same standing rights to private plaintiffs in climate change
192. See Mank, Tea Leaves, supra note 1, at 593 (predicting that Justice Sotomayor
will vote with other liberal Justices because she "has also generally endorsed a
permissive view of standing"); Dru Stevenson & Sonny Eckhart, Standing as
Channeling in the Administrative Age, 53 B.C. L. REv. 1357, 1382 (2012) (same).
193. Mank, Tea Leaves, supra note 1, at 545, 596, 601.
194. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 & n.6 (2011).
195. See Adler, supra note 173, at 309-10 (suggesting the four Justices in AEP who
found that "at least some plaintiffs" had standing were most likely referring to the
state plaintiffs); Gerrard, supra note 11 (same).
196. See infra Part V.B (detailing the Ninth Circuit's decision and reasoning).
197 Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2535.
198. Id. at 2535 n.6.
199. Mank, Tea Leaves, supra note 1, at 596-98.
200. Id. at 598 (stating the Justices "[i]mplicitly... refused... to narrow the
reach of the standing analysis in Massachusetts").
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cases as it did to states in Massachusetts. Further, it is unclear whether
the four Justices who voted for standing in AEP would support
standing for private plaintiffs in a climate change case. During oral
argument in Massachusetts, Justice Kennedy observed that the
Tennessee Copper decision, which none of the briefs in the case had
addressed, was the "best case" for the plaintiffs.20 ' Therefore, the
Court's recognition of special state standing rights under the parens
patriae doctrine was arguably Justice Kennedy's idea.202 Professor
Michael Gerrard, an experienced environmental litigator who now
specializes in climate change issues,"0 has speculated that when the
assertion from the AEP opinion that "[f]our members of the Court
would hold that at least some plaintiffs have Article III standing
under Massachusetts"204  is "considered in conjunction with
Massachusetts," a reasonable lawyer would likely infer that "Justice
Kennedy believes that only states would have standing."205  "Thus,"
Gerrard continued, "there might be a [five-to-four] majority against
any kinds of GHG nuisance claims (and maybe other kinds of GHG
claims) by non-states."20 6  The Ninth Circuit in Washington
Environmental Council seemed to agree that the Supreme Court in
Massachusetts and AEP only clearly recognized the standing of state
plaintiffs in GHG suits and imposed a more stringent standing test on
the private plaintiffs seeking to regulate GHGs.207
IV. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S APPROACH TO STANDING
Justice Kennedy was the only Justice to join the majority in all five
of the Court's key recent cases on standing, although he wrote
concurring opinions in three of them.20s Accordingly, any effort to
201. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14-15, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497
(2007) (No. 05-1120) [hereinafter Massachusetts Oral Argument] (suggesting that
Tennessee Copper demonstrated that the plaintiffs had "special" state standing rights).
202. Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1738-40 (inferring that Justice
Kennedy may have prompted the majority to apply Tennessee Copper because the
plaintiffs did not discuss the case in their briefs and, furthermore, because Justice
Kennedy has historically supported federalism and states' rights).
203. For Professor Gerard's biography, see Michael B. Gerrard, COLUM. L. ScH.,
http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/MichaelGerrard (last visited May 14, 2014).
204. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011).
205. Gerrard, supra note 11.
206. Id.
207. See Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1144-45, 1147 (9th Cir.
2013) (declining to extend Massachusetts' and AEPs conferral of standing to state
claimants to private plaintiffs), reh'g en banc denied, 741 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2014); see
also infra notes 302-15 (discussing the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Massachusetts
and AEP and its decision to deny standing to the private plaintiffs).
208. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1142 (2013) (noting that
justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555
U.S. 488, 501 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (demonstrating that in addition to
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find a consistent line of reasoning in the Supreme Court's standing
cases must focus on Justice Kennedy.209
A. Justice Kennedy Believes Congress Has Some but Not Unlimited Discretion
To Define Statutory Injuries that Give Rise to
Article III Injuies
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lujan offers the most
insight into whether Congress has the authority to recognize injuries
that would not have satisfied common law requirements, and, thus, to
enlarge the definition of concrete injury while still satisfying Article
III standing requirements." 0 There has been considerable debate
about the extent to which Congress may enlarge the definition of
concrete injury under Article III's constitutional standing
requirements.21' In his majority opinion in Lujan, Justice Scalia
argued that Article III and broader separation of powers principles
limit Congress's authority to grant universal standing rights to
joining the majority opinion "in full," Justice Kennedy also wrote a concurring
opinion); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 501 (2007) (indicating that Justice
Kennedy joined the majority opinion); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 197 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (showing that
Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion but wrote separately to assert that some
of the case's more complicated issues were "best reserved for a later case"); Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 579 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (acknowledging that Justice Kennedy "agree[d] with
the essential parts of the Court's analysis" but "wr[o]te separately to make several
observations"). See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, Standing and Secret Surveillance, 9 I/S: J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'Y (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 7-8), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2013/11/Vladeck.pdf (interpreting
justice Kennedy's concurring opinions in recent standing cases as indicative of his belief
that Congress has "wide latitude... to confer standing upon plaintiffs who might not
otherwise be entitled to sue").
209. See Mank, Informational Standing After Summers, supra note 1, at 44-45
(acknowledging that 'Justice Kennedy was the only [J]ustice to join the majority" in
several key standing cases and suggesting that "[o]ne may arguably infer from Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinions ... that the Supreme Court is likely to give some
deference to Congress if it establishes an explicit public right to information along
with a relevant citizen suit provision"); see also Vladeck, supra note 208 (manuscript at
7-8) (suggesting that Justice Kennedy's recent opinions in these key standing cases
demonstrate that he believes Congress has broad powers to confer standing).
210. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (arguing that "Congress has the power to define injuries and
articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none
existed before," provided that Congress "identif[ies] the injury it seeks to vindicate
and relate[s] the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit"); see also
Summers, 555 U.S. at 501 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (declining to find that the
plaintiffs had standing because Congress did not define a concrete injury in the
statute at issue in the case (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment)).
211. See Solimine, supra note 24, at 1028-31 (discussing several interpretations of
the scope of Congress's authority to confer Article III standing on several classes of
plaintiffs in light of the Supreme Court's standing jurisprudence).
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plaintiffs who lack a concrete injury.212  More controversially, he
contended that both Article III limits on judicial authority and the
President's Article II authority to enforce federal laws require federal
courts to impose standing injury requirements that limit
congressional authorization of suits against the executive branch.213
In his dissenting opinion in Lujan, Justice Blackmun argued that
Justice Scalia's approach to standing has the practical effect of
aggrandizing executive authority and undermining Congress's ability
to ensure that the executive branch faithfully enforces the law. Yet,
Justice Scalia in Lujan acknowledged that Congress may "elevat[e] to
the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that
were previously inadequate in law.""
Some commentators have sought a middle ground on
congressional authority to modify Article III standing requirements
that balances both the executive and congressional role in making
and enforcing federal law, as well as a limited but appropriate role for
judicial review." Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lujan
212. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576-78 (arguing that "[t]o permit Congress to convert
the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers' compliance with the law
into an 'individual right' vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer
from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional
duty, to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"' and to enable courts to
operate outside of their Article III powers to review agency actions within the
agencies' purview (quoting U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3)). See generally Antonin Scalia, The
Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SurroLK U. L.
REv. 881, 895-96 (1983) (arguing, nearly a decade before the Lujan decision, that
"the democratic process," rather than Article III courts, was designed to protect
citizens' interests).
213. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577. See generally Scalia, supra note 212, at 892 (stating that
"[e]ven if it were true ... that the doctrine of standing never excludes issues entirely
from the courts, it would still have an enormous effect upon the relationship among
the branches" if courts were given power to review agency actions traditionally within
agency control); Solimine, supra note 24, at 1049 (arguing that ChiefJustice Roberts
and Justice Scalia believe "that Congress cannot tinker with the core constitutional
standing requirements, though it might relax the prudential ones").
214. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that "the
principal effect" of the majority's approach to standing was "to transfer power into
the hands of the Executive at the expense-not of the Courts-but of Congress, from
which that power originates and emanates"); cf Solimine, supra note 24, at 1050
("With respect to the argument that a broad reading of Article III standing
improperly limits executive power under Article II, some scholars contend that
it does not give sufficient weight to the balance, as opposed to the separation,
of powers.").
215. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (emphasis omitted).
216. See, e.g., Solimine, supra note 24, at 1052 (contending that liberal and
conservative critiques of standing requirements both have "persuasive arguments
regarding the appropriate interaction of the first three articles of the Constitution"
but that the two viewpoints can be reconciled). The liberal view seeks to broaden the
judiciary's and private parties' powers "at the expense of representative government
in general and of the executive branch in particular." Id. Conversely, the
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suggests that he may take such a position with respect to Congress's
authority to modify standing requirements beyond traditional
common law requirements for a concrete injury, as he suggested that
Congress has the authority to modify common law injury
requirements, or even constitutional standing requirements, for a
concrete injury.' He agreed with the majority that a plaintiff must
demonstrate a concrete injury and that the affiants had failed to do
so when they only offered vague future plans to visit endangered
species in foreign countries allegedly threated by construction
projects partially funded by U.S. government financing." He
suggested, however, that "[a]s Government programs and policies
become more complex and far reaching," courts should recognize, at
least to some extent, congressional authority to expand the definition
of a concrete injury to include new rights of action that do not
correlate to rights traditionally recognized in common law."' Justice
Kennedy reasoned that "Congress has the power to define injuries
and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or
controversy where none existed before."220 He limited his potentially
broad endorsement of congressional authority to redefine Article III
standing with the caveat that "[i] n exercising this power, however,
Congress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate
and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit."221
In his concurrence in Lujan, Justice Kennedy balanced
Congress's discretionary authority to expand the definition of
injuries beyond common law limits against separation of powers
concerns that restrict Article III standing to concrete injuries.2
Specifically, he observed that "the requirement of concrete injury
confines the Judicial Branch to its proper, limited role in the
constitutional framework of Government." 23
conservative view broadens the President's power while also "in theory" enhancing
Congress's authority to oversee the executive agencies. Id.
217. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 579-80 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (establishing that Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority's
decision that the private affiants in Lujan lacked an injury for Article III standing but
also demonstrating that he is receptive to the idea that, given the complexity of
contemporary executive agency programs, the Court "must be sensitive to the
articulation of new rights of action that do not have clear analogs in [the] common-
law tradition").
218. Id. at 579 (indicating that plaintiffs must "demonstrate that they themselves
are among the injured" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
219. Id. at 580.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 580-82.
223. Id. at 581.
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With respect to the specific statute at issue in Lujan, Justice
Kennedy concluded that the citizen-suit provision of the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) was problematic to the extent that it purported to
extend standing to "any person."22 4 The ESA did not define how the
government would injure citizen litigants through violating the Act or
explain why "any person" is entitled to sue the government under the
statute.22 justice Kennedy treated the concrete-injury
requirement, which ensures that both parties in a case have "an
actual ... stake in the outcome," as crucial to ensure that the
opposing parties are engaged in a genuine adversarial process in
which both sides are argued with skill.22 ' The requirement,
according to Kennedy, further ensures that legal questions "will be
resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but
in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation
of the consequences ofjudicial action."2 27
Justice Kennedy's views from his concurring opinion in Summers v.
Earth Island Institute,22" which echoed those in his Lujan concurrence,
are also instructive. In Summers, Justice Kennedy explained that a
plaintiff can challenge the alleged violation of a procedural right,
such as the Forest Service's alleged duty to provide public notice and
comment before selling or leasing certain public forest land, only if
the plaintiff can demonstrate a separate concrete injury.22' He
concluded that the Summers plaintiffs did not meet this standard
because the statute at issue did not include an express citizen-suit
provision, meaning that Congress did not intend the statute to bestow
any right other than a procedural right.2 " The plaintiffs alleged that
the procedural right required the Forest Service to provide public
notice and comment before making certain decisions about the sale
and cutting down of trees in national forests.231 justice Kennedy
asserted that the "case would present different considerations if
Congress had sought to provide redress for a concrete injury
'giv[ing] rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.' 2 2
224. Id. at 580 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1) (A) (1998)).
225. Id. (remarking that Congress, when conferring standing to a class of persons
or entities through a statute, must clearly define the injury in that statute).
226. Id. at 581.
227. Id. (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
228. 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
229. Id. at 501 (Kennedy,J., concurring) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 490-91 (majority opinion).
232. Id. at 501 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting Lujan,
504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
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Thus, like his concurrence in Lujan, Justice Kennedy's concurrence
in Summers left open the possibility that he might have found that the
plaintiffs met Article III standing requirements, despite Justice
Scalia's more fundamental separation of powers concerns, if
Congress had enacted a more explicit statute that clearly defined
when a procedural injury constitutes a concrete harm to a particular
class of plaintiffs."'
In response to Justice Kennedy's opinions, Professor Michael
Solimine, a noted scholar of federal courts and civil litigation,234 has
suggested that courts interpret a statute by assessing its language,
structure, history, and purpose before they decide whether a
plaintiffs asserted facts are sufficient for Article III standing. 35
Moreover, Professor Stephen Vladeck, an expert on federal courts
and U.S. constitutional issues,23 ' has suggested that Justice Kennedy
believes Congress has significant autonomy to define standing rights
"[s]o long as Congress is not creating standing for what is (1)
effectively a generalized grievance; or (2) a procedural right without
a substantive deprivation."2 3 1 In Washington Environmental Council, the
Ninth Circuit avoided the question of whether the CAA citizen-suit
provision invoked by the plaintiffs even allowed them to sue state
regulators rather than the federal government; furthermore, the
Ninth Circuit did not consider whether Congress might have
intended to allow GHG suits under that provision.3 In light of
Justice Kennedy's willingness to consider statutory language as at
least one factor in defining Article III standing, another federal
court might be more willing than the Washington Environmental
Council panel to consider whether the CAA enlarges the ability of
private citizens to file GHG suits; however, the lack of explicit
language in the citizen-suit provision might prove fatal to a claim
233. See id.; see also Wadeck, supra note 208 (manuscript at 11) (acknowledging that
Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion in Summers because the federal
statute at issue in the case defined an "injury" that was "more capacious than [the
Court] would otherwise have identified").
234. For Professor Solimine's biography, see Michael E. Solimine, U. CIN. C.L.,
http://www.law.uc.edu/facultystaff/faculty/michael-e-solimine (last visited May 14, 2014).
235. Solimine, supra note 24, at 1055.
236. For Professor Vladeck's biography, see Stephen I. Wadeck, AM. U. WASH. C.L.,
http://www.wcl.american.edu/faculty/vladeck (last visited May 14, 2014).
237. Vladeck, supra note 208 (manuscript at 18-19) (footnote omitted).
238. Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1135 n.2 (9th Cir. 2013)
(urging the court to align itself with the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Sierra Club v.
Korleski, 681 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2012), and hold that the CAA's citizen-suit provision
does not allow plaintiffs to bring suit against the government acting in its regulatory
capacity under the CAA, such that plaintiffs lack Article III standing), rehg en banc
denied, 741 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2014).
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that the statute seeks to enable what is arguably a non-justiciable
generalized grievance.239
Professor Dave Oweno40 has interpreted the Supreme Court's
decision in Massachusetts as reflecting common federalist concerns
about the right of states to protect their citizens.24 ' He has also
argued thatJustice Kennedy prefers to interpret constitutional norms
in light of legislative determinations." The Massachusetts decision
demonstrates this theory through its reliance on the statutory
framework of the CAA to find standing, although the Court's attempt
to use that statutory framework to justify greater standing rights for
states is somewhat questionable because the CAA does not treat states
differently from other parties, as Chief Justice observed in his
dissenting opinion. 4 ' The Court in Massachusetts interpreted the
239. The CAA citizen-suit provision provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Authority to bring civil action; jurisdiction
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person may
commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to have violated (if
there is evidence that the alleged violation has been repeated) or to be in
violation of (A) an emission standard or limitation under this chapter or (B)
an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a
standard or limitation, [or]
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not
discretionary with the Administrator ....
42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1)-(2) (2012).
240. For Professor Owen's biography, see Dave Owen, U. ME. SCH. L.,
http://mainelaw.maine.edu/faculty/profiles/owen.html (last visited May 14, 2014).
241. Dave Owen, A Few Initial Thoughts on Windsor (and Massachusetts v. EPA),
ENVTL. L. PROF BLOG (June 26, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/environmental
law/2013/06/a-few-initial-thoughts-on-windsor-and-massachusetts-v-epa.html ("[I]n
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court attributed 'considerable relevance' to the state status
of the plaintiff."). Professor Owen argued that the Court's opinion in United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), reflects the same concerns about federal and states'
rights. Owen, supra. In Windsor, the majority, in an opinion written by Justice
Kennedy, held that a federal law denying federal marital benefits to same-sex
married couples who are legally recognized as married in a state violated the Fifth
Amendment's Equal Protection provisions in part because the federal law was
inconsistent with the general principle that states have the primary role in our
federalist system of defining marriage. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693, 2695-96
(reflecting that "[t]he responsibility of the States for the regulation of domestic
relations is an important indicator of the substantial societal impact the State's
classifications have in the daily lives and customs of its people").
242. Owen, supra note 241 ("It seems that Justice Kennedy would very much like
to give legislative pronouncements a greater voice in constitutional interpretation,
even where the interpretive questions involve matters like the scope of individual
rights or the jurisdiction of the courts.").
243. See supra Part II.A.1 (stating that the Massachusetts majority opinion used the
parens patriae doctrine and statutory interpretation to find that Massachusetts had
standing in the case but arguing also that the opinion does not clarify which of the
two doctrinal principles was more essential to the Court's holding).
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CAA to require the EPA to regulate GHGs on behalf of states and
other parties if those emissions "endanger[] the public health or
welfare." 244  Additionally, the Court observed that Congress has
"recognized a concomitant procedural right to challenge the
rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious." 24 5
Furthermore, the Massachusetts Court noted that the statute
specifically listed states as one of the parties that may sue to enforce
this right.246
However, Chief Justice Roberts in his dissenting opinion argued
that nothing in the statute suggested that states were entitled to more
generous standing rights than other parties The majority in
Massachusetts implied that the statute supported its theory that states
have greater standing rights than private parties,2 48 but Chief Justice
Roberts's dissenting opinion convincingly demonstrated that there is
nothing in the statutory language to support greater standing rights
for states than for other types of plaintiffs. 249
Arguably, the Massachusetts majority's citation to the statute to
bolster its state standing theory is consistent with Professor Owen's
theory that Justice Kennedy prefers a statutory justification for
constitutional interpretation, including standing.250 Justice Stevens in
his majority opinion also specifically cited Justice Kennedy's Lujan
concurrence. 5 ' As discussed below, a significant obstacle to private
plaintiff standing in GHG suits is the strong emphasis in Massachusetts
244. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 506 & n.7, 519-20, 530, 533 (2007)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (a) (1) (2006)) (discussing the EPA's statutory duty under
the CAA to "protect Massachusetts (among others) by prescribing applicable
standards" to regulate emissions from new motor vehicles).
245. Id. at 520 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)).
246. See id. at 519-20 (stating "Congress has ordered [the] EPA to protect
Massachusetts (among others)").
247. See id. at 536-37 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("Under the law on which
petitioners rely, Congress treated public and private litigants exactly the same.").
248. See id. at 518-20 (majority opinion) (stressing that the CAA provided
Massachusetts standing because it is "a sovereign State," whereas the CAA did not
confer the private litigants in Lujan a similar right).
249. Id. at 536-37 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that "Congress knows how
to ... afford[] States the right to petition [the] EPA to directly regulate certain
sources of pollution[,] but it has does nothing of the sort here").
250. Owen, supra note 241.
251. See id. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516-17 (majority opinion) (quoting
extensively from Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lujan and establishing that,
consistent with that opinion, plaintiffs must demonstrate a concrete injury to be
eligible for Article III standing); see also Vladeck, supra note 208 (manuscript at 10)
("Justice Stevens [in Massachusetts] also emphasized the critical role of Congress-
citing to Justice Kennedy's view thereof [from Lujan]: 'The parties' dispute turns on
the proper construction of a congressional statute, a question eminently suitable to
resolution in federal court. Congress has moreover authorized this type of challenge
to EPA action. That authorization is of critical importance to the standing inquiry."'
(quoting Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516)).
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on the superior standing rights of states and the possibility that
Justice Kennedy, the key swing vote in standing cases, believes that
states have superior standing rights. 252
B. Justice Kennedy and State Standing in Massachusetts v. EPA
Justice Kennedy appears to have been the driving force behind the
Massachusetts majority's reliance on the parens patriae justification for
state standing derived from the Court's decision in Tennessee Copper."
As Chief Justice Roberts noted in his dissenting opinion, the
petitioners did not cite Tennessee Copper in their briefs, nor did any of
the numerous amicus briefs or any of the three judges for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit who wrote separate opinions in
the case below. 25 ' Arizona and four other states filed an amicus brief
in which they argued that states suffer a concrete injury and have
standing to sue the federal government when a federal agency's
actions may preempt their state laws and, more specifically, that the
EPA's actions would preempt their state GHG emissions
regulations.5 The amici based their preemption argument on states'
sovereign interests in enacting its own laws rather than on the quasi-
sovereign parens patriae theory adopted in Tennessee Copper."' The
Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the other petitioners cited the
Arizona brief.257  During oral argument in Massachusetts, the
petitioners argued that states have standing to sue the federal
252. See infra Part IV.B.
253. See Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1706, 1738-40 (explaining that
Tennessee Copper "recognized a special standing doctrine of parens patriae standing
to allow states to protect certain quasi-sovereign interests including the health,
welfare, or natural resources of their citizens" and that Justice Kennedy told the
petitioners in Massachusetts that Tennessee Copper was the best authority to support
their claim of standing).
254. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 539 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see Jonathan H.
Adler, Warming Up to Climate Change Litigation 93 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 65 (2007)
(acknowledging that Justice Kennedy said Tennessee Copper was "Massachusetts' 'best
case' supporting standing," but observing also that Justice Kennedy's "reasons for
doing so [were] not entirely clear").
255. See Brief of the States of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 20-21, 24, Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497 (No. 05-1120) [hereinafter
Arizona Amicus Brief] (asserting that "courts have long recognized" states' sovereign
interests in "preserving [their] sovereignty" and "standing to sue when [they] allege
[that] an interest has been interfered with or diminished"); see also Mank, States
Standing, supra note 1, at 1737-38 (noting that a majority of the Court ultimately
found that "Massachusetts was properly asserting its quasi-sovereign interest to
require the federal government to enforce the CAA").
256. Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1738-39.
257. See Brief for the Petitioners at 6 n.5, Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497 (No. 05-1120)
(directing the Court to the Arizona Amicus Brief, supra note 255, for a discussion of
how the "EPA's decision ... threatens to have ripple effects on ... States' sovereign
power to enforce State laws").
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government when federal laws or regulations threaten to preempt
state laws, and Justice Ginsburg's comments and questions suggest
that she agreed with their preemption argument.25 ' However, the
Court did not adopt or even mention the preemption argument put
forth in that brief.259
Instead, during oral argument of Massachusetts, Justice Kennedy
suggested to the petitioners that Tennessee Copper was their "best case"
supporting standing.2 " Then, in the resulting majority opinion,
Justice Stevens emphasized the parens patriae approach in Tennessee
Copper.2 11 Justice Kennedy was likely attracted to this justification for
standing because of his propensity to strongly support federalism and
states' rights.26 For all of these reasons, it appears that the parens
258. See Massachusetts Oral Argument, supra note 201, at 14-17 (referencing the
Arizona Amicus Brief and a case from the D.C. Circuit as support for the proposition
that states have standing when federal laws and regulations threaten to preempt state
regulations); see also West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861, 864, 868 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(rejecting the EPA's argument that West Virginia and Illinois, the petitioners, did not
have standing to challenge the EPA's order concerning "electric generating unit
('EGU') growth-factor determinations" used in creating GHG emissions regulations
because the states were suing on their own behalves rather than on behalf of their
EGUs); Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA, 112
PENN ST. L. REv. 1, 30 (2007) (tracing the discussion during the Massachusetts oral
argument about the notion of "automatic or 'special' standing, at least when there is
an issue of federal preemption preventing states from regulating themselves").
259. Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1739; see Stevenson, supra note 258, at
31-36 (describing the four circuit cases cited in the Arizona Amicus Brief, supra note
255, as support for providing states standing under a preemption theory and noting
that the Massachusetts petitioners' preemption claim was only briefly discussed during
oral arguments before the Supreme Court and not in either of the Court's majority
or dissenting opinions).
260. See Massachusetts Oral Argument, supra note 201, at 14-15 (suggesting, in
contrast to the petitioners' assertion that no Supreme Court opinion within the
previous 200 years had found state standing on preemption grounds, that the 1907
Tennessee Copper opinion, which "was pre-Massachusetts versus Mellon" supported the
preemption argument); Thomas J. Donlon, Supreme Court Boldly Steps into Global
WarmingDebate, A.B.A. SEC. LiTIc. 2 (Apr. 2007), http://www.rc.com/publications
/DonlonABAArticleAPRO7.pdf ("Apparently, [Tennessee Copper] was first raised by
Justice Kennedy at oral argument."); Douglas T. Kendall & Jennifer Bradley, How
Environmentalists Can Win Over the Supreme Court, NEwREPUBLIC ONLINE (Dec. 1,
2006), http://communityrights.org/PDFs/TheNewRepl2.01.06.pdf ("Not a single
brief in the case cited Tennessee Copper, making it clear that [Justice] Kennedy had done
his homework and was approaching the standing issue from a unique perspective.").
261. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518-20 (arguing that in Tennessee Capper, as in
the case at hand, the states' "independent interest[s] 'in all the earth and air within
its domain' supported federal jurisdiction" (quoting Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907))); supra text accompanying notes 52-60 (explaining how
the majority of the Court relied on the parens patriae doctrine in Massachusetts).
262. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (holding, in an opinion
written byJustice Kennedy, "that the States retain immunity from private suit in their
own courts" and explaining that any interference with the states' sovereignty violates
the Constitution); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging that federal statutes enacted through the Commerce
Clause may violate "the etiquette of federalism" when they direct the states to enact
federal policies as well as when they lack a "strong[] connection or identification
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patriae approach in Massachusetts was Justice Kennedy's idea and that
he supplied the crucial fifth vote for standing in that case.
In light of his emphasis on the parens patriae approach, Justice
Kennedy may only support standing for states in GHG litigation and
not for private parties.' This emphasis, in combination with the
"some plaintiffs" language in the AEP opinion, has led Professor
Gerrard to speculate that 'Justice Kennedy believes that only states
would have standing. Thus, there might be a five-to-four majority
against any kinds of GHG nuisance claims (and maybe other kinds of
GHG claims) by non-states."' If Professor Gerrard is correct, then
the Ninth Circuit's implication in Washington Environmental Council
that private plaintiffs have a much greater standing burden than
states in GHG suits may be correct-at least for the current members
of the Supreme Court.6 5
V. WASHINGTON ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL
A. The District Court Decision in Favor of the Plaintiffs Only Briefly
Addresses Standing
In Washington Environmental Council, the two plaintiffs, the
Washington Environmental Council and the Sierra Club, sued the
three directors of the "Agencies"-the Washington State Department
of Ecology ("the Department"), the Northwest Clean Air Agency
("NWCAA"), and the Puget Sound Clean Air Agency ("PSCAA")-
under the CAA."' The plaintiffs alleged that the three agencies were
not enforcing Washington's State Implementation Plan ("the Plan"),
which they contended required the agencies to establish reasonably
with commercial concerns"); Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1739-40 & n.217
(speculating that Justice Kennedy's record of supporting states' rights made him
"attracted to Tennessee Copper); Kendall & Bradley, supra note 260 (arguing that the
notion of state sovereignty was one of the key principles behind the Court's decision
in Tennessee Copper and suggesting thatJustice Kennedy's reference to the case during
oral arguments in Massachusetts reflects his support for states' rights); Owen, supra
note 241 (stating that "it seems fairly likely that Justice Stevens's opinion [in
Massachusetts] was written in large part to appeal to Justice Kennedy's concerns"
about states' rights); cf Michael C. Blumm & Sherry L. Bosse, justice Kennedy and the
Environment: Property, States' Rights, and a Persistent Search for Nexus, 82 WASH. L. REv.
667, 721-22 (2007) (opining that, although Justice Kennedy's support for federalism
and states' rights is "a hallmark of his jurisprudence," he has also been known "to
dispense with state police power where not doing so might produce dual regulation").
263. Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1738-40.
264 Gerrard, supra note 11.
265. See infra Part V (analyzing how the Ninth Circuit's opinion may affect the
standing of future litigants in GHG cases).
266. Wash. Envtl. Council v. Sturdevant, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1211 (W.D. Wash.
2011), vacated sub nom., Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2013),
rehg en banc denied, 741 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2014).
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available control technology ("RACT") standards for GHG emissions
and to apply those standards to any oil refineries in the state.26 ' They
also asserted that the five oil refineries that operate in Washington
State were responsible for a significant portion of the state's total
GHG emissions.' The Western States Petroleum Association
("WSPA"), of which all five oil refineries are members, entered an
appearance as intervenor-defendants. 26' The plaintiffs and the WSPA
filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the Department,
NWCAA, and PSCAA moved to dismiss.270
The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment.27 ' The court concluded that "[the Department, NWCAA,
and PSCAA were] obligated to establish RACT for GHG emissions."2 72
Moreover, the CAA established a floor for the minimum
requirements that must be met.27' The CAA did not preclude
Washington from imposing greater regulatory requirements, which it
did in its Plan through the heightened RACT standards.2 7' Because
"the currently-approved RACT provision requires the Agencies [to]
develop [standards] for GHGs, the [court found the p]laintiffs [had]
assert[ed] a federally-enforceable cause of action."27 ' The defendants
had conceded that they were not applying the Plan's standards to
GHG emissions, leading the court to side with the plaintiffs.2 76
The district court only briefly mentioned Article III standing when
it denied the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiffs' standing
declarations.277 The district court observed that the defendants tried
to strike some of the plaintiffs' exhibits and contested the standing
issue, but the court only agreed that the exhibits were irrelevant to
the case. 7 The court explained that the nine exhibits sought to




270. Id. at 1212.
271. Id. at 1219.
272. Id. at 1212. See generally id. at 1213-15 (explaining that the state agencies
were required to establish RACT standards for GHG emissions based on the plain
language of the RACT provision, but also disagreeing with the plaintiffs that the
defendants violated the "Narrative Standard" because that standard "is not actionable
as a citizen suit").
273. See id. at 1216 (examining the plain language of the CAA and noting that the
Act merely creates minimum requirements and allows states to promulgate broader
emission standards as long as they meet the requirements).
274. Id. at 1220.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1219-20.
278. Id. at 1219.
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various ways." It concluded that documenting this connection was
irrelevant to whether the three agencies had a duty to regulate GHGs
as they addressed "broader policy questions" beyond the scope of the
litigation.2 10  After observing that those declarations had been
"submitted for the purpose of satisfying Article III and jurisprudential
standing requirements," the court denied the defendants' motion to
strike the plaintiffs' standing declarations.2 1  Thus, the district court
must have concluded that the plaintiffs' declarations had met Article
III standing requirements, but the court did not explain its reasoning.
B. The Ninth Circuit's Decision
The defendants did not challenge the plaintiffs' statement of
injuries, which alleged that increased GHGs cause a "greenhouse
effect" as GHGs trap heat in the atmosphere and, in turn, cause
harms, such as reduced snow pack and more frequent forest fires."
The Ninth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the plaintiffs'
allegations established an injury in fact."' The plaintiffs supported
their allegations with by several declarations that the "[d]efendants'
failure to set and apply RACT standards has contributed to
greenhouse gas pollution and caused their members to suffer
recreational, aesthetic, economic, and health injuries."" While the
court of appeals found that the plaintiffs satisfied the first
requirement of standing by asserting a concrete injury, it ultimately
held that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the causality and redressability
prongs. 85 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's
decision and remanded with "instructions that the action be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.""
First, in looking at causality, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the
WSPA that the connection between the defendants' alleged
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1219-20.
281. Id. at 1220 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61
(1992), which iterated the Supreme Court's contemporary standing requirements)).
282. Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2013)
(detailing the plaintiffs' various claims of that the defendants purportedly caused),
reh'g en banc denied, 741 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2014).
283. Id. at 1141.
284. Id. at 1140.
285. Id. at 1135, 1141, 1147; see also Richard Frank, New Standing Barriers Erected for
Federal Court Climate Change Litigation, LEGAL PLANET (Oct. 24, 2013), http://legal-
planet.org/2013/10/24/new-standing-barriers-erected-for-federal-court-climate-change
-litigation (analyzing the Ninth Circuit's discussion of the causation and
redressability requirements for Article III standing and arguing that the court's
standards for private plaintiffs are "formidable").
286. Wash. Envtl. Council, 732 F.3d at 1135.
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misconduct and the plaintiffs' injuries was "too attenuated."287 The
court observed that the plaintiffs had the burden of establishing that
their injuries were "causally linked or 'fairly traceable' to the
Agencies' alleged misconduct" rather than the result of GHG
emissions from third parties that were not part of the litigation."8
The court of appeals appeared to accept that the plaintiffs' assertions
that GHG emissions were causing serious environmental harms in
Washington State were valid; the defendants did not dispute the
assertion, and the EPA's findings supported it as well. 8
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit found that the " [p]laintiffs offer [ed]
only vague, conclusory statements that the Agencies' failure to set
RACT standards at the Oil Refineries contribute [d] to greenhouse
gas emissions, which in turn, contribute to climate-related changes
that result in their purported injuries." 2 o Because the plaintiffs failed
to explain how the lack of RACT controls at five refineries caused
specific injuries to their members, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the plaintiffs had "failed to satisfy their evidentiary burden of showing
causality at the summary judgment stage. "
In a broad statement likely to haunt and infuriate future private
plaintiffs filing GHG suits against individual states or single projects,
the Ninth Circuit concluded, in what is arguably dicta, that it is
difficult to prove standing causation between a local source of GHGs
and the global problem of climate change.29 2 Indeed, attempting to
establish a causal nexus in this case may be a particularly challenging
task because there is a natural disjunction between the plaintiffs'
localized injuries and the greenhouse effect. The Ninth Circuit
explained:
Greenhouse gases, once emitted from a specific source, quickly mix
and disperse in the global atmosphere and have a long
atmospheric lifetime. Current research on how greenhouse gases
influence global climate change has focused on the cumulative
environmental effects from aggregate regional or global sources.
But there is limited scientific capability in assessing, detecting, or
287. Id. at 1141.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1142.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1142-43. In a footnote, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the Second
Circuit's finding of standing causation in AEP "because the Second Circuit case
involved a different procedural posture (a motion to dismiss, rather than summary
judgment) and state entities-both of which permit less strenuous levels of proof to
achieve standing." Id. at 1143 n.6.
292. Id. at 1143.
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measuring the relationship between a certain GHG emission
source and localized climate impacts in a given region.29 3
Because the plaintiffs could not "quantify a causal link" between
GHG emissions from the five refineries in Washington State with
global climate change in that state or "anywhere else," the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to prove standing
causation.29 ' The Ninth Circuit's reasoning, however, is based on
current scientific methods. Scientists are currently developing
"downscaling"295 methods to examine smaller geographic areas than
those typically found in global climate computer models and to
enable plaintiffs to "assess[], detect[], or measure [e] the relationship
between a certain GHG emission source and localized climate
impacts in a given region. "296
The Ninth Circuit correctly observed that there are many different
sources of GHG emissions within and outside of the United States
that combine to cause climate change. 9 The court next relied on
the declaration of the WSPA's expert that the GHG emissions of the
five oil refineries in Washington State, which emit 5.94 million metric
tons of carbon dioxide equivalents or 5.9% of GHG emissions in the
state, were "scientifically indiscernible" because of "the emission
levels, the dispersal of GHGs world-wide, and the absence of any
meaningful nexus between Washington refinery emissions and global
GHG concentrations now or as projected in the future."298 The Ninth
Circuit concluded the plaintiffs' purported causal chain was "too
tenuous" because multiple third parties not before the court also
contribute to global GHG emissions.9
In response to the WSPA's argument that it could not prove
causation when numerous third parties emit far more GHGs than the
five Washington State refineries at issue in the case, the plaintiffs
contended "a causal connection is inferred."oo The Ninth Circuit
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1143-44 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also noted that
it had "explained in a case involving potential GHG emissions from aviation activities
that the causal chain between those activities and localized environmental harm is
untenable." Id.
295. "Downscaling" is a process that involves using climate models, statistics, and
data to calculate, on a case-by-case basis, local and regional climate characteristics
and how they may impact global climate change. From Global Climate Change to Local
Consequences, REALCLIMATE (Nov. 3, 2013), http://www.realclimate.org/index.php
/archives/2013/11/from-global-climate-change-to-local-consequences.
296. Wash. Envtl. Counci4 732 F.3d at 1143.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1143-44 (internal quotation marks omitted).
299. Id. at 1144.
300. Id.
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rejected the plaintiffs' inferred causal connection argument by
distinguishing between a possible inference of adverse environmental
effects from the Agencies' failure to set RACT standards, as opposed
to the plaintiffs' standing burden of proving that the alleged
regulatory failure injured them.3 o
Further, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
the relaxed standing approach in the Massachusetts decision applied
to their case.so2 The court explained: "In contrast to Massachusetts v.
EPA, the present case neither implicates a procedural right nor
involves a sovereign state. Rather, [the] Plaintiffs are private
organizations, and therefore cannot avail themselves of the 'special
solicitude' extended to Massachusetts by the Supreme Court."sos
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that, even assuming the
plaintiffs were entitled to this relaxed standard, "the extension of
Massachusetts to the present circumstances would not be tenable."304
The court of appeals limited the scope of Massachusetts by
emphasizing the Court's language. The Massachusetts majority had
described the proposed regulation of GHG emissions from U.S.
motor vehicles as making a "'meaningful contribution"' to global
GHG levels because the American motor-vehicle sector constituted
6% of global carbon dioxide emissions.30  By contrast, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that the GHG emissions in its case did not make a
"meaningful contribution" to global GHG emissions because the five
Washington State refineries only contributed 5.94 million metric tons
of carbon dioxide equivalents, or 5.9% of state GHG emissions, and
the plaintiffs failed to address the extent to which those emissions
contributed to national or global GHG emissions.07
In a footnote, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the Supreme Court's
standing analysis in AEP.sos Because AEP only clearly suggested that
the state plaintiffs in the case had standing, the Ninth Circuit implied
that the decision offered no support to the solely private plaintiffs in
301. Id. The court explained: "Injury to the environment alone is not enough to
satisfy the causation prong for standing. Here, [the] Plaintiffs must still establish that
their specific, localized injuries are fairly traceable to the Agencies' failure to set RACT
standards for the GHG emissions from the Oil Refineries." Id. (citation omitted).
302. Id.




307. Id. at 1145-46.
308. Id. at 1146 n.8.
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Washington Environmental Council..o. Additionally, the GHG emissions
at issue in AEP were far greater than those at stake in Washington
Environmental Council because the plaintiffs in AEP asserted that the
electric companies were "the five largest emitters of carbon dioxide
in the United States, collectively responsible for 650 million tons
annually-equivalent to 25% of emissions from the domestic electric
power sector, 10% of emissions from all human activities [in the
United States], and 2.5% of all man-made emissions worldwide.""'o
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit remarked that the Washington
Environmental Council plaintiffs "fail [ed] to provide any allegation or
evidence of [the impact of the five Washington State refineries on]
global GHG levels at the summary judgment stage. "
The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs could not prove
redressability. 12 The court observed that any possible reduction of
GHG emissions from imposing RACT standards would not be
meaningful "because RACT is a low bar and many sources are likely
already meeting or exceeding RACT.""'' Furthermore, the court
reasoned that even the complete elimination of all GHG emissions
from Washington refineries would result in "scientifically
indiscernible" reductions in global GHG levels.314 Ultimately, the
Ninth Circuit held that the private plaintiffs were not entitled to the
relaxed redressability standards the Supreme Court had granted to
the state plaintiffs in Massachusetts.15
C. Will Washington Environmental Council Limit Standing in Future
Private GHG Suits?
Professor Richard Frank' has sharply criticized the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Washington Environmental Council, complaining that its
approach to standing in private plaintiff GHG suits "bodes ill for
future climate change litigation, both within the Ninth Circuit and
nationwide."" He has argued that the court was wrong to sharply
distinguish between private and state plaintiffs when it declined to
309. Id. See generally Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2532,
2535 (2011) (reasoning, based on Massachusetts, that at least "some plaintiffs" had
standing because three of the plaintiffs were states).
310. Wash. Envtl. Council, 732 F.3d at 1146 n.8.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 1146.
313. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
314. Id. at 1146-47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
315. Id. at 1147.
316. For Professor Frank's biography, see Richard Frank, U.C. DAvis SCH. L.,
http://www.Iaw.ucdavis.edu/faculty/frank/index.aspx (last visited May 14, 2014).
317. Frank, supra note 285.
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follow Massachusetts because "that distinction actually was not
especially relevant to the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation
and application of the causation and redressability standing rules in
Massachusetts."s"s However, even if the Massachusetts decision was
ambiguous or vague about the extent to which state plaintiffs enjoy
greater standing rights than private plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of the Massachusetts decision in Washington
Environmental Council is narrow but not clearly inconsistent with
that decision."'9
Professor Frank also criticized the Washington Environmental Council
court for not distinguishing or discussing the court's own 2004
decision in Covington v. Jefferson County,320 where the court "had found
standing in [a] climate change case based on facts roughly analogous
to those in Washington Environmental Council, and using an expansive
standing analysis that closely presaged that adopted in
Massachusetts."321 The majority opinion in Covington, however, took a
relatively narrow approach to standing by concluding that the private
plaintiffs had standing pursuant to the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) because chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) had
leaked from refrigerators located in the defendants' landfill onto the
plaintiffs' neighboring property. 22  In a concurring opinion, Judge
Gould argued that, in some circumstances, plaintiffs should be able
to sue based on the global impacts of chemicals like CFCs on the
environment; however, he also acknowledged that courts might have
318. Id.; see also Jonathan Zasloff, Comment to New Standing Barriers Erected for
Federal Court Climate Change Litigation, LEGAL PLANET (Oct. 29, 2013, 6:49 PM),
http://legal-planet.org/2013/10/24/new-standing-barriers-erected-for-federal-court-
climate-change-litigation (taking issue with Professor Frank's characterization of the
case because "Stevens did indeed fudge the standing argument: he said that a state
has special solicitude, and then went ahead as if he was using the regular [Lujan]
framework[, b]ut it's a little hard to say that [Massachusetts] lets private parties sue on
climate issues"). For Professor Zasloff's biography, see Jonathan M. Zasloff UCLA
SCH. L., http://www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/all-faculty-profiles/professors/Pages/jonathan
-m-zasloff.aspx (last visited May 14, 2014).
319. See Zasloff, supra note 318 (commenting "I agree with you that this was a very
conservative panel, but it seems to me to be something of a stretch to say that the
panel was out-of-bounds here").
320. 358 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2004).
321. Frank, supra note 285; see Zasloff, supra note 318 (noting that Covington
predated Massachusetts).
322. Covington, 358 F.3d at 633, 635, 638-40, 650 (explaining that the Ninth
Circuit found that the plaintiffs had standing under the RCRA because they
produced evidence that the county's inadequate operation of its landfill increased
the risk "of fires, of excessive animals,... and of groundwater contamination," thus
harming the plaintiffs and satisfying the standing requirements); see also Mank,
Standing and Global Warming, supra note 30, at 40-41 (adding that the Ninth Circuit
found that the Covington plaintiffs also had standing under the CAA).
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to put some limits on global environmental impact suits if they
became too numerous.3 23
Professor Frank's characterization of Covington more accurately
reflects Judge Gould's concurring opinion than the majority opinion.
Because Judge Gould's concurring opinion pre-dates the Supreme
Court's decision in Massachusetts, it is not clear whether it would still
be valid precedent even if it were a majority opinion of the Ninth
Circuit and not merely a concurring opinion.' The Ninth Circuit in
Washington Environmental Council was not bound as a matter of
precedent by Judge Gould's concurring opinion," although the
Ninth Circuit's opinion would have been more persuasive if it had
mentioned Covington as a background decision.
Professor Frank concluded that the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Washington Environmental Council will effectively bar most private
plaintiff GHG suits. Specifically, he has said:
Assuming the Ninth Circuit's decision in Washington Environmental
Council remains undisturbed, it is likely to have profound, adverse
effects on climate change litigation advanced by citizen suit
plaintiffs in the future. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any private
citizen or environmental group that could satisfy the formidable
causation and redressability standards recently fashioned by the
Ninth Circuit. And given the Ninth Circuit's nationwide influence
when it comes to environmental and natural resources law, one can
expect that Washington Environmental Council will be cited and
followed in other federal courts around the nation.
When it comes to Article III standing rules in climate change
litigation, the precedential effect of [Massachusetts] has, in a
323. Covington, 358 F.3d at 650-55 (Gould, J., concurring); see also Mank, Standing
and Global Warming, supra note 30, at 41-45 (discussing Judge Gould's concurring
opinion in Covington and his generally broad view of standing in lawsuits
involving global pollution issues, as well as his reservation that federal courts
have prudential authority to limit such suits if they became so numerous that
they burden the courts).
324. See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
325. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285 n.5 (2001) (implying that
concurring opinions normally do not have precedential effect); Bronson v. Bd. of
Educ. of Cincinnati, 510 F. Supp. 1251, 1265 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (stating "concurring
opinions have no legal effect, and thus, are in no way binding on any court"); Ryan
M. Moore, Comment, I Concur! Do I Matter?: Developing a Framework for Determining the
Precedential Influence of Concurring Opinions, 84 TEMP. L. REv. 743, 744 (2012)
(explaining that "concurring opinions written by a single appellate-level jurist are not
considered binding upon lower courts and have almost no dispositive impact upon
the law on which they speak" although they may indirectly influence the
development of future legal decisions). In rare cases involving a "fragmented"
Supreme Court in which there is no majority opinion, a limiting concurring opinion
may establish binding law. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193-94 (1977)
(giving an example of a plurality holding that established the legal standard
regarding constitutionally protected materials).
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relatively short period of time, become marginalized to an extreme
degree. How unfortunate.3 2 6
Professor Frank's claim that the Washington Environmental Council
decision would eliminate most or all private GHG suits if courts
outside of the Ninth Circuit follow it is likely true for private GHG
suits targeting a single state or project, but it is not necessarily true
for private suits challenging national regulations that involve large
amounts of GHGs. The Ninth Circuit's approach to standing
causation and redressability would likely bar most suits involving a
single state's emissions or the emissions of a single project, which
generally are far smaller than the national vehicle emissions
constituting 6% of global carbon dioxide emissions that were at stake
in Massachusetts."' Private groups arguably could still sue the EPA
over national rules that affect large amounts of GHGs, such as suits
involving the regulation of GHGs from fossil fuel power plants.328 For
example, the Obama Administration is currently proposing to
regulate GHG emissions from new electric utility generating units.2
If adopted, environmental groups could theoretically challenge
the regulations as insufficiently stringent to address climate
change because the large amount of emissions involved arguably
would meet the meet the "meaningful contribution" causation
standard from Massachusetts.330
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case that might
limit but not totally eliminate the EPA's ability to regulate GHGs
from stationary sources.3 3 ' But assuming that the case does not
completely foreclose the EPA's regulation of GHGs from stationary
sources pursuant to the CAA, private environmental groups could
still possibly challenge national regulations concerning either mobile
(vehicular) or stationary sources. Those sources arguably meet the
326. Frank, supra note 285.
327. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007).
328. E.g., Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1430, 1433
(proposed Jan. 8, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (proposing a rule
"limit[ing] GHG emissions from fossil fuel-fired power plants, specifically [carbon
dioxide], since they are the nation's largest sources of carbon pollution").
329. Id. at 1430.
330. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 524-26 (stating that although regulating vehicle
emissions would not solve the problem of global warming, such prospective
regulations satisfied the redressability standard because their "meaningful
contribution" would "slow or reduce" global emissions).
331. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 418 (2013) (limiting review to the
following question: "Whether [the] EPA permissibly determined that its
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles triggered
permitting requirements under the Clean Air Act for stationary sources that emit
greenhouse gases").
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"meaningful contribution" causation and the "slow or reduce"
redressability standards from Massachusetts.332 Because regulations
with national or global GHG impacts were not before it, the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Washington Environmental Council did not address
and does not foreclose private GHG suits involving a substantially
larger quantity of GHGs than the 5.94 million metric tons of carbon
dioxide at issue in the case.
D. Briefs on Possible En Banc Review
On October 31, 2013, fourteen days after the three-judge panel
had issued its decision, the Ninth Circuit issued an order in
Washington Environmental Council announcing that a judge had called
for a vote to rehear the case en banc.333  The plaintiffs' brief
supporting rehearing en banc argued that the panel had
misinterpreted Massachusetts and AEP when it denied standing."4
The plaintiffs argued that even though states are entitled to "special"
solicitude under Massachusetts' standing analysis, "the state must still
meet Article III causation and redressability standards" because "the
[Supreme] Court did not modify those standing requirements in
Massachusetts v. EPA."3 ' They also asserted that under Lujan's
standing test, they only needed to show that GHGs from the
refineries contributed to climate change and that the RACT
standards would mitigate those harms to some degree."3 While the
Ninth Circuit panel had claimed that the emissions from the five
refineries in Washington State were not enough to make a
"meaningful" contribution to GHG emissions under Massachusetts
and AEP, the plaintiffs argued that the refineries were significant
sources of emissions.3 In their view, the EPA's and Washington State's
GHG limits clearly regulate those emissions and courts should use those
regulations to set any cutoffs for what constitutes a significant injury for
standing causation and redressability purposes.3
332. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 524-26 (stating that although regulating vehicle
emissions would not solve the problem of global warming, such prospective
regulations satisfied the redressability standard because their "meaningful
contribution" would "slow or reduce" global emissions).
333. Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, No. 12-35358 (9th Cir. Oct. 31, 2013). The
court ordered the parties to submit fifteen-page briefs within twenty-one days. Id.
334. Brief in Support of Rehearing En Banc at 1, 12, 14-15, Wash. Envtl. Council
v. Bellon, 741 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-35323).
335. Id. at 13.
336. Id. at 6-7, 13-15.
337. Id. at 3-6.
338. Id. at 8-9 (noting that the combined emissions from the five plants make
those plants Washington's second-largest producer of GHGs and further noting that
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The WSPA, the intervenor-defendant-appellant, argued that the
panel decision "di[id] not present any basis for en banc review.""' To
the WSPA, the panel correctly applied the Article III standing rules
for causation and redressability in concluding that the plaintiffs had
failed to meet those two standing tests.340 The WSPA argued that the
panel was correct in interpreting the Massachusetts decision to require
that the plaintiffs satisfy the Supreme Court's "meaningful
contribution" standard and in concluding that the refineries'
emissions were too small to have any meaningful impact on global
GHG emissions."' Additionally, the WSPA contended that the panel
decision presented "no conflict with Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit
precedent, nor any issue of 'exceptional importance.' Accordingly,
there [were] no grounds for en banc review."342
The brief by the defendant-appellant, Maia D. Bellon, the Director
of Washington State's Department of Ecology, was the most
intriguing because she opposed en banc review.343 However, she also
argued that the panel should consider revising its opinion to remove
or soften some dicta suggesting that private parties might never be
able to file GHG suits.344
Bellon's brief first argued that en banc review was unwarranted
because the "sole purpose would be to re-weigh factual
considerations by the panel" as to whether the plaintiffs' allegations
provided sufficient evidence to establish standing causation and
redressability. 345 In contrast, her brief then suggested that the panel
consider changing or eliminating dicta suggesting that private
plaintiffs might never be able to prove standing in GHG suits. 46
the quantity of their emissions are "almost [sixty] times larger than [the] EPA's
permitting threshold").
339. Opposition to Rehearing En Banc by Western States Petroleum Ass'n at 1,
Wash. Envil. Council, 741 F.3d 1075 (No. 12-35323).
340. Id.
341. Id. at 8.
342. Id. at 1.
343. Defendant-Appellant Maia Bellon's Brief on Whether Case Should Be
Reheard En Banc at 1, Wash. Envtl. Council, 741 F.3d 1075 (No. 12-35323)
[hereinafter Bellon Brief].
344. Id. at 1-2. Specifically, Bellon observed:
[T]he panel's opinion also includes dicta suggesting that it might be difficult
for private plaintiffs ever to establish causation in a climate change lawsuit.
The panel's decision rests, in part, on a concurring opinion in Native Village
of Kivalina v. Exxonmobil Corp. Although en banc review is unwarranted, the
panel may want to rehear the matter to determine whether its decision
contains unnecessarily broad dicta and whether its reliance on a concurring
opinion was proper.
Id. (citation omitted).
345. Id. at 4-5.
346. Id. at 6, 8.
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While the Massachusetts decision had reserved "special solicitude" for
state standing claims, Bellon's brief observed that the causation
analysis in that decision "is not expressly limited to states.""
Furthermore, the Bellon brief criticized the panel's reasoning by
characterizing its broad language about the appropriateness of
private GHG suits as mere dicta.348 She admitted that "it can
sometimes be difficult to distinguish between dicta and a court's
holding" and suggested the panel could rehear to clarify this point.349
Still, Bellon's points regarding dicta implied the panel was too eager
to announce broad principles about future suits rather than assume
the properjudicial role of addressing the specific facts in the case.
The Bellon brief also questioned the panel's reliance on a
concurring opinion as well as its failure to clearly state that it was
relying on a concurring opinion.sso According to Bellon, the majority
in Kivalina did not decide the standing question."' The brief
emphasized that one of the judges simply cited lack of standing as
another basis for dismissing suit.352  Moreover, since "[c]oncurring
opinions generally lack binding effect," Bellon argued that the panel
should rely on Kivalina as persuasive, not binding, authority.353 Thus,
she asserted that "[t]he panel may want to rehear this matter to
determine whether its reliance on Kivalina is necessary to its
conclusions."3 54  In this way, despite ultimately rejecting en banc
review, the Bellon brief gave a low or failing grade to the broad
reasoning in the panel decision.
E. Ninth Circuit Denies RehearingEn Banc, but Three Judges Dissent and
Two Panel Members Defend Their Decision
On February 3, 2014, the Ninth Circuit denied en banc review in
Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon." However, three Ninth
Circuit judges wrote a dissenting opinion criticizing the panel's
decision to deny private GHG plaintiffs standing and arguing that the
Circuit should have granted en banc review.1' In response, two
347. Id. at 7.
348. Id. (reasoning that the statements were not necessary to the decision).
349. Id. at 7-8.
350. Id. at 8-9.
351. Id. at 8.
352. Id.
353. Id.; see sources cited supra note 325 (explaining that concurring opinions
generally lack precedential value).
354. Bellon's Brief, supra note 343, at 9.
355. 741 F.3d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 2014).
356. Id. at 1079-81 (Gould,J., dissenting).
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members of the original three-judge panel responded to the
dissenting opinion and defended the panel decision.
Dissenting from the denial, Judge Gould, joined by Judges Wardlaw
and Paez, argued that the original panel's opinion was overly broad
in interpreting Massachusetts as denying standing rights to all non-
state GHG plaintiffs. 3 5 He also found the panel's decision was too
restrictive by adopting an "unidentified threshold of emissions" test
to "foreclose [] citizen suits seeking to use the Clean Air Act . .. to
fight global warming."' Responding to Judge Gould's dissenting
opinion, two judges who were members of the original panel, Judges
Milan Smith and N. Randy Smith, concurred in the denial of
rehearing en banc and explained that the panel's holding was
compelled by Lujan.36" The judges argued Lujan "established
stringent standing requirements for private litigants seeking to
challenge the government's regulation of third parties."3 6 '
Furthermore, Massachusetts applied "relaxed standing" only to
cases involving both procedural violations and suits by sovereign
states; neither characteristic applied to the facts of Washington
Environmental Council.3 62
1. judge Gould's dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Gould argued that the panel had
misinterpreted Massachusetts by concluding that non-state entities can
never bring GHG suits under the CAA and, therefore, that the Ninth
Circuit erred in denying a rehearing en banc.3 13 He explained:
Massachusetts v. EPA, in my view, does not mean that only states
have standing for environmental challenges relating to global
warming. The Supreme Court's reasoning endorsed the principle
that causation and redressability exist, independent of sovereign
status, when some incremental damage is sought to be avoided.
Accordingly, Massachusetts v. EPA also confers standing upon
individuals seeking to induce state action to protect the
environment.3 6
357. See id. at 1076-79 (Smith, J., concurring) (arguing that Lujan's stringent
standing requirements compelled the panel to deny rehearing en banc and because
Massachusetts' "relaxed standing" applied only to different factual circumstances).
358. Id. at 1079 (GouldJ., dissenting).
359. Id. at 1081.
360. Id. at 1076 (Smith, J., concurring); see Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732
F.3d 1131, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2013) (providing the membership of the original Ninth
Circuit panel), reh' ken banc denied, 741 F.3d 1075.
361. Wash. Envtl. Council, 741 F.3d at 1075 (SmithJ., concurring).
362. Id. at 1077.
363. Id. at 1079 (GouldJ., dissenting).
364. Id. at 1080.
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From a policy standpoint, Judge Gould argued that denying standing to
non-state GHG plaintiffs would hinder efforts to combat the grave threat
of global warming. 1 5 He concluded his dissent by arguing that 'just as a
state has Article III standing to sue the federal government to encourage
federal action to stem global warming," pursuant to the Massachusetts
decision, "so too may individuals or environmental organizations sue
states to encourage state action for the same purpose. "366
2. Judge Milan Smith's rebuttal to judge Gould and defense of the panel
decision
In his opinion concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc,
Judge Milan Smith explained that the panel's holding was
"compelled" by Lujan." He described Lujan as applying more
stringent standing requirements to private litigants challenging
government regulation of third parties than to parties directly
challenging government regulation that allegedly directly injures
them." However, while Judge Smith properly interpreted Lujan to
apply more stringent standing requirements to private litigants
challenging government regulation of third parties, most lower
courts currently do not actually apply more stringent standing
requirements in these cases as opposed to in cases involving parties
directly challenging government regulation.69 Apparently this trend
has resulted from Justice Scalia's reasoning in Lujan being weakened,
although not overruled, by the Supreme Court's subsequent decision
in Laidlaw.1 0 In this case, the Court held that the plaintiffs, who had
avoided recreational activities in a river because of "reasonable
concerns" about pollution the defendant had released into the river,
had standing to sue under the Clean Water Act even if they could not
365. Id. at 1081.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 1076 (SmithJ., concurring).
368. Id. at 1076-77.
369. See, e.g., Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1147-51
(9th Cir. 2000) (holding plaintiffs had standing in light of Laidlaw because of
recreational injuries traceable to defendant's pollution); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 156-64 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(same); see also Christopher Warshaw & Gregory E. Wannier, Business as Usual?
Analyzing the Development of Environmental Standing Doctrine Since 1976, 5 HARV. L. &
POL'Y REv. 289, 289, 300, 302, 320 (2011) (providing an empirical analysis of 1,935
lower court cases between 1976 and 2009 showing that justice Scalia's two Lujan
decisions led to more dismissals of environmentalist suits by regulated industries
than by beneficiaries of regulations, but that the subsequent Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000), reversed that trend).
370. See Warshaw & Wannier, supra note 369, at 320; see also supra notes 32-33
(discussing Laidlaw).
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prove that the pollution caused actual environmental harm."' Thus,
because the Supreme Court's standing jurisprudence contains both
restrictive and liberal elements, 7 2 it is possible for Judge Smith to
come to a far different interpretation of that jurisprudence than
Judge Gould.
Judge Smith also made a more specific argument that Lujan placed
the burden on the plaintiffs at the summary judgment stage to
demonstrate that imposing RACT requirements on the five refineries
would reduce their GHG emissions and "mitigate global climate
change in a way that would alleviate [the] Plaintiffs' alleged
injuries."' Because Washington State introduced evidence that
RACT standards are "a low bar and [that] many sources [were] ...
already meeting" that standard, the Ninth Circuit panel concluded
that the plaintiffs' request for an injunction imposing RACT
standards was unlikely to bring significant GHG reductions.7
Judge Smith also distinguished Massachusetts from Washington
Environmental Council on two grounds. He explained the driving
factors in Massachusetts were that "(1) the asserted injury was an
alleged procedural violation, and (2) the action was brought by a
sovereign state" and that "[n]either factor [was] present" in the case. 375
While Judge Smith accurately describes these two elements, it is not
clear that they are required for standing in every GHG case. First, in
AEP, four Supreme Court Justices recognized standing in a
substantive tort suit seeking an injunction, not in a procedural suit.376
Accordingly, for at least four Justices, standing in GHG suits is not
limited to procedural cases involving the CAA.s Second, the Court
did not squarely decide the issue of non-state standing rights in GHG
371. Fiends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 173, 181-84; see Warshaw & Wannier, supra
note 369, at 296-97 (giving the example of one member of Friends of the Earth who
would not use the North Tyger River for recreational activities because "it looked and
smelled polluted" due to "Laidlaw's discharges").
372. See Warshaw & Wannier, supra note 369, at 296-97 (contrasting the Lujan and
Laidlaw decisions and particularly noting that Laidlaw loosened the standards that
must be met to establish injury in fact).
373. Wash. Envtl. Council, 741 F.3d at 1077 (SmithJ., concurring).
374. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
375. Id. (citation omitted).
376. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2534-35 (2011) (noting
that the private plaintiffs sought injunctive relief under the law of nuisance or, in the
alternative, state tort law to require the defendants to cap their GHG emissions and
that fourJustices found they had standing to bring the claim); see also supra Part III.E
(analyzing the Supreme Court's decision in AEP, noting that it was unusual for the
Court to expressly discuss its division over the standing issue, and speculating about
AEPs impact on future standing decisions).
377. See Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2534-35 (accepting that private plaintiffs'
claim in a state tort case).
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suits in Massachusetts or AEP.' Judge Smith might be correct that
those two decisions only clearly recognized state standing, but they
did not as clearly bar non-state standing as the panel decision in
Washington Environmental Council suggested.' Because it was unclear
whether RACT requirements would significantly reduce GHG
emissions, the panel decision may have been correct in denying
standing to the plaintiffs.380 However, the panel decision's language
arguably was broader than necessary in suggesting that non-state
plaintiffs may never bring GHG suits. 8 '
CONCLUSION
The Washington Environmental Council decision is an important case
potentially barring all private GHG suits involving a limited number
or amount of greenhouse gas emitters. However, it did not decide
the broader question of whether private parties can challenge the
EPA's national regulation of the largest GHG sources, including
power plants and motor vehicles. Specifically, Washington
Environmental Council did not resolve whether all private GHG suits
are barred because the facts in case involved five state refineries as
opposed to large sources of GHG emissions, like in Massachusetts and
AEP. There is a significant difference between the 6% global GHGs in
Massachusetts, the 2.5% global GHGs in AEP, and the roughly 5.9%
GHGs for Washington State at issue in Washington Environmental Council
The Ninth Circuit recently rejected en banc review of Washington
Environmental Council. The plaintiffs-respondents argued that the
panel erred in not applying the EPA's and Washington State's GHG
limits for permitting and reporting, which do apply to the refineries,
when it decided what level of emissions is significant enough to
demonstrate standing causation and redressability."' While rejecting
en banc review as inappropriate in the case, the defendant
contended that the broad language in the panel's decision was mere
dicta that went too far in rejecting the possibility of any private GHG
378. See supra text accompanying notes 85-89, 263-65 (discussing the
Massachusetts and AEP decisions and showing their implication that only non-state
actors would lack standing to bring suit).
379. See supra text accompanying notes 302-11 (explaining that the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Washington Environmental Council clearly provided that private
parties lacked standing because they could not meet the causality requirement).
380. See supra text accompanying note 313 (noting that the RACT standards were
not difficult to meet).
381. See supra text accompanying notes 343-49 (suggesting that the court's broad
language could be dicta and thus, not legally binding).
382. Brief in Support of Rehearing En Banc, supra note 334, at 8-10.
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suits. 8' Furthermore, the defendant criticized the panel for relying
on a concurring opinion without making clear it was doing so. 384
Moreover, the defendant suggested the panel was too eager to
conclusively settle the issue of private GHG suits.38 5
It is possible that the Ninth Circuit or another lower court in a
future case might reject all GHG suits by private parties, including
challenges to regulations that affect significant amounts of GHGs
comparable to the amounts at issue in Massachusetts or AEP. In
previous articles, this Author has contended that the Massachusetts
decision was ambiguous or vague about the extent to which state
plaintiffs enjoy greater standing rights than private plaintiffs and
essentially left the question of private party GHG suits open for
another day.'86  A future lower court decision might interpret
Massachusetts and the "some plaintiffs" language in AEP to bar any
private party GHG suits as an impermissible generalized grievance
best suited for resolution by the political branches and beyond the
power of the federal courts because everyone in the world is affected
by GHGs and climate change.
There is plausible but limited evidence to suggest that Justice
Kennedy likely supports standing only for state plaintiffs and not for
private plaintiffs. During oral arguments in Massachusetts, he
emphasized Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., a case involving state parens
patriae suits." In AEP, the Court cryptically observed that four
Justices followed Massachusetts in determining that "some" of the
383. Bellon's Brief, supra note 343, at 7; see also supra note 348 and accompanying
text (noting that dicta does not have precedential value).
384. Bellon's Brief, supra note 343, at 8-9; see also supra notes 350-54 (asserting
that because concurring decisions are non-binding authority, the panel should
rehear the matter to reconsider citing a concurring opinion in a previous Ninth
Circuit standing case).
385. See supra text accompanying notes 349-350.
386. See Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases, supra note 1, at
871 (observing that the Massachusetts decision did not resolve the standing rights of
private plaintiffs in GHG suits); Mank, States Standing, sup-a note 1, at 1733-34, 1746-
47, 1755-56 (criticizing Massachusetts for not clarifying whether and to what extent
the special treatment of state standing in the case resulted from the parens patriae
doctrine as opposed to the special standing rights of plaintiffs seeking to vindicate
procedural rights or other factors).
387. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011) (stating
that four members of the Court would find that "some plaintiffs" had standing under
Massachusetts); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535-49 (2007) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing that the Court's previous standing decisions have held that
only the Congress and the President can adequately provide redress for GHG
emissions issues).
388. See Sara Zdeb, Note, From Georgia v. Tennessee Copper to Massachusetts v.
EPA: Parens Patriae Standing for State Global-Warming Plaintiffs, 96 GEo L.J. 1059,
1065-66 (2008) (explaining that the Court ultimately relied on language from
Tennessee Copper in its ruling and emphasized the special role of state litigants).
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plaintiffs had standing"'-most likely, the state plaintiffs. Because
the Massachusetts decision was ambiguous about the extent to which
state plaintiffs enjoy greater standing rights than private plaintiffs and
did not resolve the issue of whether private parties can bring GHG
suits,s"o Justice Kennedy could reject private GHG suits without
reversing the Massachusetts holding that states have standing to file
GHG challenges to national regulations that could make a
"meaningful contribution" to global GHG emissions.
Prohibiting all private GHG suits because they are generalized
grievances is closer to the spirit of Chief Justice Roberts's dissenting
opinion in Massachusetts, but such an approach is not clearly
contradictory to the Massachusetts decision because the Court only
decided state standing rights. State governments could continue to
file GHG suits pursuant to Massachusetts, at least for regulations
involving significant amounts of GHGs comparable to the amounts at
issue in Massachusetts. In the future, the Supreme Court will likely
have to address standing in a private GHG suit involving larger
amounts of GHGs than those at issue in Washington Environmental
Council and finally resolve whether private parties may ever file GHG
challenges. Unfortunately for future private plaintiffs in GHG cases,
previous standing decisions hint that Justice Kennedy-the Court's
crucial swing vote in standing cases-may only support standing for
states in GHG suits and would dismiss any private GHG suits.
389. See Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2535 (noting the Court's division on the
standing issue). See generally Gerrard, supra note 1 I (calling the Court's statement of
its decision on the standing issue "the most intriguing paragraph in the opinion").
390. See supra note 386 and accompanying text (referencing this Author's other
works that analyze the ambiguity in the Massachusetts decision).
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